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ABSTRACT 
Interrelationships among conceptions of the nature of 
scientific knowledge, inductive reasoning, and achievement 
in science were examined for a sample of 305 suburban high 
school students. Epistemological beliefs were measured 
using a questionnaire developed for the study on the basis 
of the philosophic literature and portions of philosophical 
models of existing instruments. The final version consisted 
of 56 items organized into seven subscales representing 
different dimensions of scientific knowledge. The Essay 
Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies, Part A, developed by 
Norris and Ryan (1987a), was selected as the measure of 
inductive reasoning. The test requires subjects actively to 
employ inductive reasoning strategies. Students' 
achievement in science was measured by the final grade 
received in the past school year for general science, 
biology, chemistry, physics, and earth science. 
Students' conceptions included beliefs that scientific 
knowledge: (a) represents real world phenomena, (b) is 
fallible, (c) is changeable, (d) is a product of the human 
imagination, (e) must be subjectable to empirical test, (f) 
is acquired slowly, and (g) should be questioned when 
reasonable to do so. Students' inductive reasoning was 
characterized by a superficial treatment of the reasoning 
tasks. Students tended not to (a) withhold judgement, (b) 
seek additional information, (c) suggest alternate 
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conclusions, and (d) monitor their own progress. 
Results of a path analysis indicated that students' 
conceptions of scientific knowledge exerted strong 
significant effects on achievement in general science, 
biology, chemistry, and physics. The effect of scientific 
knowledge conception on reasoning was significant for the 
biology group. Significant effects were also found for 
reasoning on general science and biology achievement. 
Reasoning was found to play a much smaller role in 
determining science achievement than did conceptions of 
scientific knowledge. 
A factor analysis of the questionnaire subscales 
empirically divided the variable of scientific knowledge 
conception into four factored variables. The results 
revealed that the large direct effect for conception of 
scientific knowledge on reasoning and science achievement 
was due to beliefs that knowledge: (a) was a representation 
of real world phenomena, (b) must be testable, (c) is 
fallible, (d) is changeable, and (e) should be questioned 
when appropriate to do so. 
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CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW 
This study examines the relationships among high school 
students' conceptions of the nature of scientific knowledge, 
their inductive reasoning ability, and their achievement in 
science. A sample of 305 senior high school students were 
administered an epistemological questionnaire and The Essay 
Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies, Part A (Norris & 
Ryan, 1987a), while their achievement in science was 
measured using final grades in general science, biology, 
chemistry, physics, and earth science. A path analysis was 
performed to determine the strength of causal relationships 
among the variables. 
Students reason using their existing knowledge to 
derive conclusions and new knowledge. In addition, it has 
been clearly demonstrated (Rubba, 1976; Cotham & Smith, 
1981; Aikenhead, 1987) that students' conceptions of 
scientific knowledge vary. It is plausible to infer, then, 
that knowledge viewed differently may be used differently in 
reasoning, affecting the quality of reasoning, the type of 
reasoning strategies used, and the conclusions drawn. 
Isolating the role that epistemological beliefs have on 
students' reasoning could have a profound effect on 
curriculum design and instruction. our present science 
curricula place very little emphasis on epistemological 
issues (Perkins & Simmons, 1988). If it can be shown that 
accurate conceptions of scientific knowledge lead to 
improved reasoning, and to improved science achievement, 
then the motive to develop science curricula with an 
epistemological focus would be stronger. 
Statement of the Problem 
The present study addresses five specific research 
questions: 
1. What conceptions of scientific knowledge are held 
by high school students? 
2. What inductive reasoning strategies are used by 
high school students? 
3. What is the relationship between students' 
conception of scientific knowledge and their 
inductive reasoning ability? 
4. What is the relationship between students' 
conception of scientific knowledge and their 
achievement in science? 
5. What is the relationship between students' 
inductive reasoning ability and their achievement 
in science? 
The major hypotheses are: (a) students who have a 
deeper understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge 
are better inductive reasoners; (b) students who have a 
deeper understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge 
will attain higher science achievement scores; and (c) 
students who are better inductive reasoners will attain 
higher science achievement scores. Justification for 
2 
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proposing these hypotheses is outlined in the following 
sections. 
Educational Considerations 
Important goals of science education include developing 
in students an adequate conception of the nature of 
scientific knowledge and proficient reasoning ability. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that our present 
science curricula are incapable of accomplishing these 
goals. It is well documented that students have 
misconceived notions of the nature of scientific knowledge 
(Cooley & Klopfer, 1963; Aikenhead, 1973; MacKay, 1971; 
Rubba, Horner, & Smith, 1981; Welch, 1981; Aikenhead, 1987; 
Carey, Evans, Honda, Jay, & Unger, 1988). Likely 
contributors to the development of these misconceptions are 
current teaching practices and curriculum materials that 
misrepresent science and convey a stereotyped image of 
scientific knowledge production. The notions of once-and-
for-all disproof, indubitable observation, precise 
definition, and perfect precision, among others, pervade our 
science texts in the guise of the normal practice of 
science. The step-by-step scientific method is a common 
sight in high school science texts, even though most 
philosophers of science agree that there is no such 
scientific method (Norris, in press). Hodson (1986b) 
states: 
The failure of modern science courses to achieve fully 
some of their declared goals in relation to children's 
4 
understanding of the nature of science is due, in part, 
to a degree of confusion in the philosophical position 
underpinning many contemporary curricula and, in part, 
to the continuing failure to provide teachers with an 
adequate understanding of the basic issues in the 
philosophy of science and their importance in the 
design of learning experiences. (p. 222) 
Also, numerous authors have reported lack of adequate 
reasoning skills in students. Perkins, Allen and Hafner 
(1983) characterized learners as "make sense 
epistemologists". Many learners analyse a problem situation 
only to the point where it makes superficial sense. They 
tend not to reflect on their thought processes nor to 
consider alternate ways of creating a solution. Schoenfeld 
(1985) describes examples where students perform meaningless 
calculations on a problem while paying no attention to 
whether their approach is justified, or even to whether 
progress is being made. 
The present curriculum encourages such poor reasoning 
processes. Wasserman (1984) states that we succeed in 
developing students good at performing hundreds of school 
exercises that require single, correct answers. These same 
students have problems with tasks that call for imagination, 
for suggesting hypotheses, or for taking any cognitive or 
creative risks. The recitation method dominates most 
schools and it is the major approach in most teachers' 
repertoires. 
With so little emphasis on the process of thinking, the 
students who succeed in the present system are not 
necessarily those who have the greatest understanding, but 
those who use their memory best. Students frequently get 
good grades in science with no more than a superficial 
understanding of its concepts and relationships, and 
therefore don't have the ability to use these in the real 
world. 
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Problem-solving as portrayed in school curricula is 
much too mechanistic. Teachers and textbooks normally (a) 
list rules, (b) provide examples and (c) have students apply 
the rules in a context where they are told which rules apply 
where. Even in novel situations, decisions that should 
require thought become automatic. Similar beliefs are 
echoed by many researchers such as Baron (1985), Freire 
(1974), Perkins (1985}, Perkins and Simmons (1988), and 
Stice (1987). 
If we are to accomplish our educational goals of 
developing more appropriate conceptions of scientific 
knowledge and competent reasoning ability, we must become 
familiar with those variables that influence the attainment 
of these goals. Our science curricula should address not 
only what is known by science, but should also address how 
science has come to arrive at such knowledge (Duschl, 1988). 
We must discover the relationships between views of what 
knowledge is and where it comes from, and how that knowledge 
is used in the reasoning process. 
Rationale of the Study 
In the fields of educational research and philosophy 
there is mounting support for the idea that higher order 
thinking skills are linked to epistemological beliefs. 
Despite the fact that there have been very few experimental 
studies in the area, there is considerable theoretical 
support from such authors as Posner, Strike, Hewson and 
Gertzog (1982}, Perkins and Simmons (1988}, and Newmann 
(1988). 
In proposing their model of conceptual change, Posner 
and his colleagues emphasize epistemological beliefs as an 
influencing factor in the conceptual change process. They 
claim that the degree to which one analyses the nature of 
evidence, understands the importance of parsimony in a 
theory, and believes in the orderliness of nature, affects 
the way in which one accepts conceptual change. 
Perkins and Simmons (1988} identify four "frames" or 
categories of student understanding. The content frame 
deals with the facts and definitions of the subject matter. 
The problem-solving frame contains problem solving 
strategies, beliefs about problem solving, and processes 
that help the learner stay organized during the problem 
solving process. The inquiry frame is comprised of 
knowledge and attitudes necessary for challenging and 
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extending the knowledge in a domain. Finally, the epistemic 
frame "focuses on the general norms having to do with the 
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grounding of the concepts and constraints in a domain" (p. 
311) . "Facts" are considered valid by the standards 
established in the epistemic frame. 
In our science curricula, students have little 
opportunity to learn about the inquiry or epistemic frames 
or about the interrelationships between the different 
frames. students mainly receive instruction in content. 
Perkins and Simmons state: 
Real understanding consists in a web of relationships 
that connect with content knowledge but also with 
knowledge in the problem-solving, epistemic, andfor 
inquiry frames. Failure to recognize this web of 
interrelationships leads to instruction that allows and 
even exacerbates the naive and ritual patterns of 
misunderstanding. (p. 323) 
Newmann (1988) concurs that thoughtfulness involves 
attitudes, personality traits, and general values and 
beliefs about the nature of knowledge. He explains that 
normally there is resistance on the part of the learner to 
the development of higher-order thought processes. In order 
to generate student engagement in tasks requiring higher-
order processes, this resistance must be addressed openly. 
He reports that several researchers have found that students 
prefer passive well-defined roles with simple, mechanistic 
answers and an absence of mental conflict (McNeil, 1986; 
Powell, Farrar, & Cohen, 1985; Willis, 1977). This "lower-
order mindset" is characterized by beliefs that include the 
following: (a) most knowledge is certain, (b) knowledge is 
created by outside authorities, (c) knowledge is to be 
learned as quickly as possible, and (d) knowledge may seem 
counter-intuitive or mysterious with respect to one's 
experience, but should be believed anyway. 
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Schommer (1989) provides experimental evidence to show 
that students' beliefs about the nature of knowledge have 
distinct effects on their reading comprehension. She 
concludes that epistemological beliefs affect the critical 
interpretation of knowledge and thus, to some degree, 
determine how we draw conclusions from information. 
Specifically, poorly established epistemological beliefs in 
the areas of speed of knowledge acquisition and certainty of 
knowledge result in conclusions that are oversimplified or 
inappropriately absolute. Schommer agrees that epistemic 
concerns should be recognized explicitly. Raising students' 
consciousness about their own beliefs, and teaching them how 
these views influence their learning, has the potential for 
far-reaching effects in the field of education. 
Theoretical Framework 
Conceptions of Scientific Knowledge 
People's conceptions of scientific knowledge are 
comprised of beliefs about the source and status of that 
knowledge. Statements such as "A scientific statement is 
true if most scientists believe it", or "Observation in 
science is influenced by opinion" can constitute part of a 
conception of scientific knowledge. There is no single 
universally accepted view of the nature of scientific 
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knowledge among scientists and philosophers of science since 
there are many issues on which different positions are held. 
Several of these issues and the positions generally 
considered most accurate are described below: 
(1) The fallibility of observation. The predominant 
view is that observations are based on inadequate 
sense experience. Observations are based upon 
fallible prior knowledge and must be interpreted 
in the light of current theoretical beliefs 
(Hanson, 1958; Hodson, 1986a; Norris, 1984). 
(2) The role of human creativity and imagination. The 
view of Popper (1972) is that concepts and 
theories are products of creative minds. 
(3) The role of inductive generalization. The 
predominant view is that inductive generalization 
is inadequate as a description of the process of 
scientific knowledge production (Popper, 1972). 
(4) The nature of change in scientific knowledge. 
The consensus within the philosophic 
literature is that scientific knowledge is 
tentative. Concepts and theories change and 
develop over time while some are discarded 
(Conant, 1951; Kuhn, 1962; Schwab, 1960). 
(5) The nature of the scientific method. The 
dominant view is that there is no single 
universally followed, step-by-step 
"scientific method" (Black, 1954; Conant, 
1955) . 
(6) The testability of scientific knowledge. Hempel 
(1966) states that scientific hypotheses must be 
subjectable to empirical test. 
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Other issues relating to the role and status of 
theoretical knowledge and the role of the community of 
scientists in scientific practice tend to be more 
contentious. Regardless, student conceptions or 
misconceptions of science must envelop these and other 
philosophical issues. The ideas have direct bearing on 
science curricula and are taught either explicitly, or, as 
some researchers have suggested, implicitly, through 
language and behaviour (Herron, 1977; Lederman, 1986b; 
Munby, 1973, 1976; Zeidler and Lederman, 1989). Instruments 
constructed to measure students' conceptions must model the 
diversity of views of these different epistemological 
issues. 
Inductive Reasoning 
There have been numerous definitions of inductive 
reasoning put forward in the past four decades. Guildford 
and Lacey (1947) defined it as the ability to see trends and 
relations. French, Ekstrom, and Price {1963) described 
induction as "the finding of general concepts that will fit 
sets of data; the forming and trying out of hypotheses." (p. 
19). More recently, Colberg, Nester, and Cormier {1982) 
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state that induction should be defined as a non-
demonstrative argument in which the conclusion does not 
necessarily follow from the premises. Skyrms {1975) 
distinguishes between deduction and induction in the 
following way: 
An argument is deductively valid if and only if it is 
impossible that its conclusion is false while its 
premises are true. An argument is inductively strong 
if and only if it is improbable that its conclusion is 
false while its premises are true. (p. 7) 
According to Ennis (1987) inductive reasoning is one 
component of critical thinking. He defines critical 
thinking as "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused 
on deciding what to believe or do" (p. 10), and he has 
proposed a comprehensive model for the concept. In his 
model, thinking starts from a basis of information. 
Reasoning is carried out on the information leading to some 
decision or conclusion. The reasoning process, or 
inference, is of three main types: deduction, induction, or 
value judgement. Inductive inferences are inferences that 
generalize information or inferences that explain 
information. Since conclusions derived from reasoning are 
inferred from information, the process of inference has a 
fundamental role in critical thinking (Norris, 1988b). 
Ennis's conception of critical thinking and the place of 
inductive reasoning in it has been adopted as part of the 
conceptual framework for this study. 
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Methods 
The instrument used to measure students' 
epistemological beliefs is a questionnaire that was 
developed for the study. The questionnaire consists of 56 
Likert-scale items compiled in seven subscales. Each of the 
subscales is organized around a specific dimension of 
scientific knowledge. These dimensions are: (a) scientific 
truth, (b) the fallibility of scientific knowledge, (c) the 
changeability of scientific knowledge, (d) the role of 
creativity in scientific knowledge production, (e) the 
testable nature of scientific knowledge, (f) the speed of 
scientific knowledge acquisition, and (g) the role of 
authority in scientific knowledge acquisition. The 
subscales are designed so that opposite ends of each scale 
represent alternate views or conceptions of that particular 
dimension of scientific knowledge. 
The Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies. Part 
A (Norris & Ryan, 1987a) has subjects imagine they are on an 
unknown planet where their task is to use various clues to 
explain how they would search for living creatures. The 
test requires subjects to actively employ inductive 
reasoning strategies. Their reasoning is then measured 
against an ideal model for the situation. Subjects are 
graded according to their use of the following strategies: 
(a) taking all relevant information into account; (b) 
seeking more information when it is appropriate; (c) 
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generating alternative conclusions, explanations and 
hypotheses; (d) withholding judgement when appropriate; (e) 
monitoring the progress of one's reasoning; (f) handling 
complex problems in an organized manner; and (g) keeping 
focused to the main point. The essay test format allows the 
scorer more accurately to assess the process of reasoning 
since it is more apparent how conclusions are derived than 
on other types of pencil-and-paper tests. 
Student achievement in science is measured using 
science grades from the previous academic year. Grades in 
five subject areas are used: general science, biology, 
chemistry, physics, and earth science. 
Both the epistemological questionnaire and the 
inductive reasoning test were administered to a group of 305 
high school students in grades 10-12. Pearson product-
moment correlations are used to relate variables while the 
strength of causal relationships are examined using path 
analysis. 
Summary 
The present study examines the interrelationships among 
the variables of students' conceptions of scientific 
knowledge, inductive reasoning ability, and achievement in 
science. Failure of the present curriculum to produce 
adequate student conceptions of the nature of scientific 
knowledge and proficient reasoning ability provide 
motivation for the study. 
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The basic assumptions underlying the study are: (a) 
knowledge conceived differently will be used differently in 
the reasoning process, and (b) adequate conceptions of 
scientific knowledge will result in better reasoning and 
better achievement in science. An epistemological 
questionnaire developed for the study is used to measure 
conceptions of scientific knowledge, while the Essay Test of 
Inductive Reasoning Strategies, Part A (Norris & Ryan, 
1987a) is used to measure inductive reasoning ability. 
Student science achievement is assessed using final grades 
from the previous school year. 
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
In order to understand the relationship between 
students' conceptions of scientific knowledge and their 
reasoning ability, I have chosen to examine literature in 
three areas. The review starts with a discussion of 
research related to students' conceptions of scientific 
knowledge. Variables correlating with students' conceptions 
will be examined and instruments used to measure students' 
conceptions will be evaluated. Barriers to research in the 
area will also be discussed. The second part of the review 
deals with current research in the area of inductive 
reasoning ability. Variables correlating with this ability 
will be examined. Tests to measure inductive reasoning 
ability will be described and assessed. The third and final 
section of the review will describe recent research that has 
attempted to relate student epistemology and cognitive 
skills. Research in this area, however, is quite limited 
with only several studies being carried out, all in recent 
years. 
student Conceptions of the Nature of 
Scientific Knowledge 
Developing an understanding of the nature of science 
and scientific knowledge has long been an important 
objective of science educators. In recent years both the 
National Science Teachers Association in the United States 
and the Science Council of Canada have expressed renewed 
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interest in the educational goal of developing 
scientifically literate students with a greater 
understanding of the nature of science (NSTA, 1982; Science 
Council of Canada, 1984). 
Appraisal of Student Conceptions 
Students' conceptions have been measured on numerous 
occasions with students of various ages. Results indicate 
typically that students possess inadequate conceptions of 
the nature of science (Cooley & Klopfer, 1963; MacKay, 1971; 
Rubba et al., 1981; NSTA, 1982; Aikenhead, 1987; Carey et 
al. , 1988) . 
One of the most comprehensive appraisals of students' 
conceptions was conducted by Welch as part of Project 
Synthesis (Welch, 1981). This project, funded by the 
National Science Foundation, was a joint effort of 23 
researchers representing a wide variety of roles and 
perspectives within the science education community. The 
purpose was to portray the state of science education in the 
United States in the late 1970's (Kahl & Harms, 1981). 
Welch concluded that although there was some cognizance of 
the nature of scientific inquiry, there was a general lack 
of in-depth student understanding. 
More recently, in an extensive study by Aikenhead 
(1987}, over 10,000 students were asked to make a written 
reaction to a statement concerning a science-technology-
society topic and to write a paragraph explaining the 
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reasons for their response. The statement was one of 46 
statements used on Views on Science-Technology-Society 
(Aikenhead, Fleming, & Ryan, 1987). Aikenhead found that 
students generally hold contradictory beliefs about 
scientific knowledge. For example, almost 100% of a 
subsample of 236 students believed scientific knowledge is 
tentative, but their reasons were varied. Most students 
(45%) viewed the tentativeness of scientific knowledge from 
a reconstructionist position. That is, new knowledge 
replaces old. Many students (20%) viewed scientific 
knowledge as tentative strictly in the cumulative sense. 
Scientific knowledge does not change but is added to. 
Others (20%) believed that changes to scientific knowledge 
were a result of technological advances. Aikenhead noted 
that students did not have uniform meanings for the 
frequently used terms "scientific fact" and "scientific 
method" nor did they seem to be aware of outside influences 
on scientific knowledge. 
Carey et al. (1988) described the epistemological 
stance of 76 junior high students as believing that 
knowledge is acquired passively and is a faithful copy of 
the world. They believed the inquiry process is limited to 
observing nature rather than constructing explanations of 
the phenomena of nature. 
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Factors Influencing Development of Student Conceptions 
With few exceptions, experimental research has not 
produced evidence that indicates the source of student 
conceptions. Generally researchers have been concerned with 
what the specific student conceptions are but not with how 
these conceptions have come to be adopted. The basic 
assumption, as first described by Robinson (1969), is that 
through the normal discourse of teaching, teachers' 
conceptions are adopted by their students. While seeming 
logical, this has not been demonstrated conclusively in 
research. If the assumption is true, there are two relevant 
questions that need to be answered: (a) What is the origin 
and degree of adequacy of teacher conceptions? and (b) How 
do teachers transmit their conceptions of scientific 
knowledge to their students? 
Philosophy and teacher conceptions. In his seminal 
article, Robinson (1969) declared not only that teachers' 
conceptions of the nature of science are an important force 
in shaping their classroom behaviour, but he also asserted 
that the teacher training of the time did not provide the 
necessary philosophical background to develop a philosophy 
of science teaching consistent with the nature of scientific 
knowledge. During the last two decades, numerous authors, 
following Robinson's lead, have claimed that the 
relationship between philosophy of science and science 
education should be examined. Martin (1972) stated that the 
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relevance of the philosophy of science to science education 
has been unexplored, but philosophy of science can help 
science educators in their educational practice. Ennis 
(1979) noted that problem areas in science education such as 
the nature of the scientific method and the part played by 
scientists' value judgements could profit from research in 
the philosophy of science. Abimbola (1983) recognized that 
important goals of the philosophy of science are directly 
related to the science curriculum, including how scientific 
knowledge is established and validated, and how it 
eventually changes form and meaning. 
Other authors have concluded that teachers' conceptions 
of scientific knowledge are inadequate since they are 
grounded in inappropriate philosophical beliefs. A report 
published by the Association for Science Education in the 
United Kingdom (Association for Science Education, 1979), 
states that most science teachers are products of an 
education system that places emphasis on scientific 
knowledge while neglecting the history and philosophy of 
science. As a result, science teachers have a scant 
understanding of the nature of science itself. 
Elkana (1970) claims that teachers' philosophical views 
lag contemporary views by as much as twenty to thirty years. 
Hodson (1988) agrees that teaching practices in the 
classroom are impeded by teachers who operate under 
principles of science that philosophers have long considered 
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inadequate. Specifically, he criticizes the commonly held 
inductivist view that f r om simple unbiased observations 
students can inductively spawn scientific generalizations. 
He contends that scientists bring speculation and opinion to 
observation and tha t new knowledge must be anchored to the 
learners' prior knowledge. Thus, the assumption that 
unbiased observations lead automatically to infallible 
conceptual explanations is unfounded. 
Duschl {1988) claims that school science is dominated 
by the authoritarian view that scientific knowledge is 
considered absolute and final. The source of this view, he 
believes, is rooted in the outdated philosophy of logical 
positivism developed during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Duschl maintains that a more accurate view of the 
nature of scientific knowledge must attend to humanistic and 
social issues in addition to the facts of science. 
Two recently conducted ethnographic studies have 
provided insight into influences on teachers' conceptions of 
scientific knowledge. Gallagher {1991) carried out a study 
of 25 preservice secondary science teachers enrolled in his 
university methods course. He concluded that since there is 
no formal teacher education in history, philosophy, or 
sociology of science, teachers' knowledge is limited to the 
body of science. Science textbooks used in teacher training 
reinforce the role of teaching content knowledge to 
students, and many instructors act as presenters of factual 
knowledge. The result is that scientific training has not 
provided much understanding of the process by which 
scientific knowledge is formulated. 
In a study involving 13 preservice teachers, King 
(1991) found that most teachers believed that the history 
and philosophy of science should be taught in their 
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preservice programs. The teachers interviewed did not know 
how they would teach topics on the nature of science and 
perceived they did not have enough knowledge to do so. King 
quotes one student: 
I learned science as a collection of facts, with no 
knowledge of how these facts came to be facts, or why 
these facts are considered facts. When I talk about 
teaching my students to think critically, I guess what 
I mean is that they have that historical and 
philosophical knowledge so that they understand and can 
appreciate the hows and whys. I wonder how I'll be 
able to teach this way, given my shallow knowledge of 
science. The only thing I feel I'm prepared to do now 
is to teach my students the facts I learned. (p. 139) 
Despite this literature, there are authors who believe 
teachers' conceptions are changing and may not be as 
inadequate as some researchers believe. In a study of 
preservice teachers' understanding of the nature of science, 
Anderson, Harty, and Samuel (1986) compared the responses of 
a group of 24 preservice teachers on Kimball's Nature of 
Science Scale (NOSS) in 1969 to a group of 21 preservice 
teachers in 1984. The 1984 group responded closer to the 
model response provided by Kimball than did the 1969 group. 
The authors conclude that teachers entering the field today 
have a more accurate conception of the nature of science. 
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A closer look at this study reveals, however, that 
these results must be i n terpreted very cautiously. The 
sample sizes for both groups were very small. The groups 
were not equivalent in age, sex, or bachelor's degrees held. 
The 1984 group was older, better educated, and had a higher 
proportion of females. The grade point averages of the two 
groups were not compared. The model of the nature of 
science on which NOSS is based was developed over twenty 
years ago. The test is based on debatable notions such as 
curiosity, regardless of outcomes or applications, being the 
only driving force for the generation of scientific 
knowledge, and scientists' being uniquely open-minded and 
willing to change in the face of new evidence. It is 
doubtful that performing well on this test means one 
necessarily holds a contemporary philosophical view. 
Lederman (1986a) and Lederman and Zeidler (1986) 
studied 18 high school biology teachers and their 409 
students to determine student and teachers' conceptions of 
the nature of science and to compare their conceptions to an 
"adequate conception". The instrument used was the Nature 
of Scientific Knowledge Scale (Rubba, 1976). Their results 
showed that teachers scored higher than students on every 
subscale of the instrument and that students scored higher 
than the neutral response on each subscale. They concluded 
that teachers and students do have adequate conceptions of 
the nature of scientific knowledge. This conclusion 
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contradicts most research in the area. Lederman and Zeidler 
point out that even thou gh teachers may possess adequate 
conceptions, this does not necessarily mean that they will 
exhibit teaching behaviours that will increase students' 
understanding. 
Teaching behaviour and practices. Over twenty years 
ago, Robinson (1969) focused attention on teacher practices 
necessary for teaching how scientific knowledge is 
constructed. He specifically noted the importance of 
teacher language and the role of the science laboratory in 
developing students' conceptions of scientific knowledge. 
Since that time there has been relatively little research 
with the goal of determining the effect of teaching 
behaviour and practices on student conceptions. In the last 
several years there have been a number of studies that have 
attempted to isolate teaching behaviour, curriculum 
materials, classroom variables, and teacher language as 
influences on student conceptions of the nature of science. 
These vary in research methodology and have provided 
somewhat inconsistent results. Several of the more 
ambitious projects have been carried out by Norman Lederman 
and his colleagues. Lederman's work has concentrated on the 
dynamics of teaching behaviour and classroom variables as 
influences on student conceptions. Other studies, taking an 
ethnographic approach, have focused on the effect of 
curriculum materials and teachers' instructional decisions 
on students' conceptions. 
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With a sample of 18 teachers and 409 high school 
students, Lederman (1986b) and Lederman and Druger (1985) 
attempted to relate specific classroom variables and 
teaching behaviours to changes in student conceptions. 
Their methodology consisted of five basic procedures. 
First, they administered the Nature of Scientific Knowledge 
Scale (NSKS) (Rubba, 1976) as a pretest at the beginning of 
the school semester. Second, throughout the semester, 
intensive qualitative classroom observations were made. 
Third, teachers and students were given a posttest of the 
NSKS. Fourth, classroom variables were derived by a 
systematic qualitative comparison of teachers and classes 
ranked as generally scoring high on the NSKS with those 
generally scoring low on the NSKS. The final procedure was 
a quantitative analysis of the classroom variables to 
determine if the variables statistically discriminated 
between the high scoring teachers and classes and the low 
scoring teachers and classes. 
Results of the studies indicated that teachers 
possessed conceptions generally considered to be "more 
adequate'' than those of the students. Teachers scoring 
highest on the NSKS were more supportive and dynamic than 
low scoring teachers. Also they questioned more, related 
content to students' personal lives, placed less emphasis on 
rote memory, and assigned less seatwork than teachers who 
scored low on the NSKS. Teachers' conceptions were not 
found to be significantly related to changes in students' 
conceptions. 
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Zeidler and Lederman (1989) used the same sample and a 
similar procedure to examine Munby's (1973, 1976) 
proposition that implicit messages hidden in teachers' 
language influence student conceptions of the nature of 
science. From qualitative classroom observations, the 
authors categorized teachers on the basis of their language 
as holding the Realist or Instrumentalist conception of the 
nature of science. Their results indicate that teachers' 
language reveals implicit conceptions of the nature of 
science that can be conveyed subsequently to students. 
Thus, the ordinary language teachers use can provide the 
context in which student conceptions are developed. 
Lederman and O'Malley (1990) attempted to identify the 
sources of students' beliefs about the tentativeness of 
scientific knowledge. Students completed an open-ended 
questionnaire followed by an interview in which the subjects 
were asked to state the sources of their beliefs or elicit 
descriptions of those experiences that altered their 
beliefs. The researchers found that when students were 
asked about the sources of their beliefs or experiences that 
led to changes in their beliefs, they were unable to 
identify either. The authors concluded that this inability 
to identify sources indicates that an understanding of the 
nature of science may be learned implicitly. Further 
support for this idea is provided by Herron (1977) and 
Lederman (1986b). 
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In contrast to Lederman's position, Gallagher (1991) 
and King (1991) suggest that secondary science teachers' 
conceptions play a fundamental role in forming the image of 
science held by students. As well, Mitman, Mergendoller, 
Marchman, and Packer (1987) describe factors such as: (a) 
curriculum materials, (b) the nature of the teacher's 
instructional activities, and (c) the teacher's verbal and 
written instructions explicitly referring to the nature of 
science, as influencing student conceptions of the nature of 
science. 
These authors contend that ethnographic procedures are 
required to isolate the effect teachers' beliefs have on the 
learning environment. Criticism that can be made of 
Lederman's approach include the high level of inference 
required in the design and employment of observational 
instruments and a non-recognition of the effect of the 
curriculum on teacher decisions and practices. Mitman et 
al. (1987) point out that it is especially difficult to 
design an instrument that can isolate students' perceptions 
of classroom events independent of their basic feeling of 
the class. 
Attempting to isolate variables of teacher behaviour 
and practice and to relate them to student conceptions is 
both difficult and intriguing. It appears that the 
variables of teacher behaviour, classroom practice, 
curriculum, and language form a complex mix from which the 
learner may be influenced to varying degrees either 
explicitly or implicitly. 
Available Instruments to Measure Students' Conceptions of 
Scientific Knowledge 
To carry out the present study, an instrument to 
measure student conceptions of scientific knowledge had to 
be found or developed. An extensive search of the 
literature revealed only one instrument that dealt 
specifically with appraising student conceptions of 
scientific knowledge: The Nature of Scientific Knowledge 
Scale (NSKS) (Rubba, 1976). Several other instruments 
attempt to measure student conceptions of the general area 
of the nature of science. 
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What follows here is a description of those instruments 
examined as part of the selection process. The evaluation 
of conceptions of scientific knowledge is an essential 
component of all the instruments described. The instruments 
have for the most part been widely used and accepted in the 
research field. 
Test on Understanding Science (TOUS) . Perhaps the best 
known measure of conceptions of the nature of science was 
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developed by Cooley and Klopfer {1961a). The TOUS is a 
four-alternative 60 item multiple-choice test. 
to one of three areas or subscales: 
Items belong 
Subscale I. Understandings about the scientific 
enterprise {18 items). 
Subscale II. The scientist {18 items). 
Subscale III. Methods and aims of science {24 items). 
Items from subscale III relate most to student 
conceptions of scientific knowledge. There are eight themes 
in this area for which items were developed. The themes 
are: (a) generalities about scientific methods, (b) tactics 
and strategies used in the process of science, (c) theories 
and models, (d) the aims of science, (e) accumulation and 
falsification, (f) controversies in science, (g) science and 
technology, and (h) unity and interdependence of the 
sciences. 
The test was validated by an analysis of scientists at 
work and references to the history and philosophy of science 
literatures. Practitioners in the fields of science, 
science education, teaching, and history and philosophy of 
science were consulted regarding the content of items. One 
of the preliminary forms of TOUS was field tested. The 
overall Kuder-Richardson formula 20 reliability coefficient 
was found to be 0.76 (Cooley & Klopfer, 1961b). 
Science Process Inventory CSPil. The Science Process 
Inventory, Form c is a 150 item, forced-choice, agree-
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disagree, scale developed by Welch (1966). The inventory is 
intended to appraise knowledge of the process of science 
possessed by secondary school students. Specifically, the 
inventory assesses students' "understanding of the methods 
and processes by which scientific knowledge evolves" (Welch 
and Pella, 1968, p.64). A more recent version of the SPI, 
Form D, contains 135 items with which subjects must agree or 
disagree (Welch, 1969). 
The theoretical base for the inventory was a list of 
elements of the scientific process derived from the writings 
of Beveridge, Conant, Kemeny, Lachman, Nash, and Wilson. 
The list consisted of congruous elements which appeared in 
three or more of the six reference books. The elements were 
then presented to a panel of research scientists for 
validity judgement. The resulting outline became the basis 
for developing the instrument. 
Content validity was provided by expert opinion on the 
items as well as an item analysis of the results of a field 
trial using 380 high school students. The reliability of 
the SPI, as provided by a sample of 1283 high school 
students, was found to be 0.79. 
Wisconsin Inventory of Science Processes (WISP). A 
similar inventory to the SPI, the Wisconsin Inventory of 
Science Processes consists of 93 items that subjects are to 
describe as accurate, inaccurate, or not understood. The 
scale was constructed by the Scientific Literacy Research 
Center at Madison, Wisconsin {1967). 
The content of WISP is very similar to the SPI and is 
based on a set of assumptions that include: 
1. The universe and its natural phenomena are real 
and intelligible. Relationships are consistent 
and causal. 
2. The products of science are amoral, repeatable, 
parsimonious, tentative and probabilistic. 
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There is no information provided on the validation of 
the scale. A reliability coefficient of 0.82 was reported 
for an unidentified sample of grade 12 students {Aikenhead, 
1973). 
Nature of Science Scale CNOSS). Kimball {1967) 
developed the Nature of Science Scale to determine whether 
or not science teachers have the same view of science as 
scientists. The scale consists of 29 position statements 
for which subjects may select one of three responses: agree, 
disagree, or undecided. A model response for each item was 
obtained by preparing a model of the nature of science based 
on the philosophical views of Conant and Bronowski. The 
model was composed of eight of the following assertions 
about characteristics of science: 
1. The fundamental driving force in science is 
curiosity concerning the physical universe; 
2. Science is a dynamic, on-going activity, rather 
than a static accumulation of information; 
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3. Science aims at ever-increasing comprehensiveness 
and simplifications using mathematics as a simple, 
precise method of stating relationships; 
4. There is no one scientific method, but as many 
methods as there are practitioners; 
5. The methods of science are better characterized by 
some value-type attributes such as dependence on 
sense experience, the need for reproducibility and 
insistence on operational definitions rather than 
by techniques; 
6. A basic characteristic of science is a faith in 
the susceptibility of the physical universe to 
human ordering and understanding; 
7. Science has a unique attribute of openness: both 
openness of mind and openness of the realm of 
investigation; 
8. Tentativeness and uncertainty are characteristic 
of all science. 
Content validity was checked by a panel of nine science 
educators who judged whether the items were related to the 
model. Kimball established construct validity by the test's 
ability to discriminate between college graduates who were 
science majors and those who were not. The split-half 
reliability of the test found to be 0.72. 
Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (NSKS). This 48 
item Likert-type scale was developed by Rubba {1976) to 
assess secondary students' understanding of the nature of 
scientific knowledge. The NSKS is based on the 
characterization of scientific knowledge developed by 
Showalter {1974). This conception describes scientific 
knowledge as (a) amoral, (b) tentative, (c) expressing 
creativity of scientists, (d) parsimonious, (e) testable, 
and (f) unified. The test consists of an eight item 
subscale on each of these categories. 
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Rubba and Anderson {1978) describe the exhaustive 
process by which the NSKS was developed and validated. To 
begin, the validity of the six-factor model was established 
by a panel of three philosophers of science. Items were 
written following guidelines for construction of Likert-type 
scales and the reading level was established using a sample 
of nine sixth grade students. Items were then submitted to 
a panel of science education experts for evaluation of form 
and content and the instrument was field tested with a group 
of 31 high-ability high school juniors. After the first 
field test, item statements were submitted to a panel of 
experts consisting of two philosophers of science, two 
science educators, two scientists, two high school teachers, 
and a psychometrician. These experts evaluated the content 
validity of the item statements as compared to A Model of 
the Nature of Scientific Knowledge (Rubba, 1976). Finally, 
the instrument was field tested again with a sample of 674 
high school science students. 
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Evidence of construct validity was gathered by 
comparing the NSKS results of 40 philosophy of science 
students with the results of 125 university freshman with no 
background in philosophy. Results showed the philosophy of 
science students had higher mean scores on five of the six 
NSKS subscales as well as higher overall scores. 
Test-retest reliability was established with groups of 
52 general science and 35 advanced chemistry students. The 
Pearson product-moment correlations were 0.59 and 0.87, 
respectively (Rubba & Anderson, 1978). 
Conceptions of Scientific Theories Test (COST) . Cotham 
and Smith (1981) criticized existing tests that measure 
understanding of certain aspects of the nature of science as 
being based on single interpretations of the nature of 
science. These tests make the assumption that their 
interpretation of the nature of science is the correct one. 
Since many aspects of the nature of science are 
controversial, this assumption has been subject to criticism 
(Lucas, 1975; Martin 1972). 
In developing the Conceptions of Scientific Theories 
Test, the authors attempted to produce an instrument that 
was sensitive to alternative conceptions of particular 
aspects of scientific theories, and from which an 
understanding of the tentative and revisionary conception of 
the nature of science could be inferred. They assume, in 
taking this approach, that the tentative nature of 
scientific knowledge is one of its least controversial 
aspects. 
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COST is an attitude inventory consisting of 40 Likert-
type items. It includes four subscales which are: (a) 
ontological implications of theories, (b) testing of 
theories, (c) generation of theories and (d) theory choice. 
Each subscale is organized around an issue that can be 
polarized or represented by two alternative views or 
conceptions. 
Content validity was established by referring to the 
philosophic literature of Hempel, Kuhn, Martin, and Nagel. 
Evidence of construct validity was gathered by two 
approaches: (a) administering COST to education majors, 
college chemistry students, and college philosophy of 
science students to determine the ability of the instrument 
to discriminate between the contrasting groups; and (b) a 
statistical multi-trait multi-method procedure of Campbell 
and Fiske (1959) in which scores for the same trait 
(subscale construct) are correlated using different methods 
of measurement (different theoretical contexts). 
Reliability data of COST was not provided. 
The results of the test administration showed that 
elementary education majors, more than chemistry and 
philosophy majors, believed scientific theories to be (a) 
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tested conclusively and (b) selected by objective means. 
Also, elementary education majors, more than philosophy 
majors, believed scientific theories are generated by 
inductive means, that is, derived from observations rather, 
than invented to account for them. 
Views on Science-Technology-Society CVOSTS). This 
instrument was developed for a study carried out by 
Aikenhead, Fleming, and Ryan {1987) in which over 10,000 
Canadian high school students were sampled for their beliefs 
about science-technology-society topics. Though the 
instrument assesses the general relationships between 
science, technology, and society, a category of items 
specifically examines the characteristics and limitations of 
scientific knowledge. 
In developing their instrument, the authors rejected 
the traditional standardized instruments which I have 
summarized previously, in favour of an alternate approach. 
Instead of employing a Likert-scale, VOSTS requires subjects 
to give a two-part response. First, students react to a 
statement by agreeing, disagreeing, or saying they "can't 
tell". If they agree or disagree, then they write an 
argumentative paragraph to support or reject the statement. 
Subjects reply to one of 46 different statements which 
constitute the VOSTS instrument. 
VOSTS is in part derived from the Nature of Science 
Scale (Kimball, 1967), Science Process Inventory (Welch, 
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1966), and Test of the Social Aspects of Science (Korth, 
1968) incorporating portions of their philosophical models. 
Selection of additional items on science-technology-society 
was influenced by the work of Gauld (1982) and Ziman (1980). 
The original version of VOSTS was field tested with an 
unidentified sample. Validation procedures are not 
specified and test-retest reliability data is not provided. 
Interjudge reliability is reported as 0.84. 
Perhaps it may be assumed that, since VOSTS has been 
derived from standardized instruments, its validity rests 
with the validity of the philosophical base of those 
instruments. This view is problematic, however, as the 
theoretical models on which these instruments are based are 
subject to some debate and the authors of VOSTS themselves 
dismiss the previous standardized instruments as clearly 
inadequate. 
Limitations of Existing Instruments 
Despite the wide acceptance of these instruments, they 
have fundamental problems. The discussion that follows 
mainly addresses problems related to test construction and 
administration. As well, general conceptual limitations of 
the entire research area are noted. 
Test construction. The most profound criticism of 
these instruments is that the philosophical models on which 
they are based and the methods by which these models are 
derived are inappropriate. Lucas (1975) argues that test 
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developers should evaluate critically how they have come to 
accept a particular model of science for a test they are 
creating. He notes that most of the authors of standardized 
instruments examined in a review by Aikenhead (1973) simply 
appeal to the philosophical literature for a consensus of 
opinion. These authors are relying on the assumption that 
consensus will necessarily produce the correct model. This, 
despite the fact that there is still considerable debate in 
the field as to the nature of scientific knowledge. 
Different philosophical models advocated by different 
researchers will result in variation, and sometimes 
contradictions, in the expected responses of test items. A 
higher total test score simply means the subject subscribes 
to the same philosophical view as the test developer (Lucas, 
1975). Due to the lack of agreement on what constitutes the 
nature of science, many tests purport to measure the general 
conceptions of the nature of science but focus on different 
aspects of the domain. 
In a study analyzing several instruments, Doran, 
Guerin, and Cavalieri {1974) found that there were very poor 
correlations among three instruments tested. With a sample 
of 300 high school students they compared results on the 
Nature of Science Scale (Kimball, 1967), Science Support 
Scale {Schwirian, 1968), and Test on the Social Aspects of 
Science (Korth, 1968). They found no relationships among 
broad topics covered on the tests and very few relationships 
38 
between pairs of subtests. They concluded that each 
instrument seems to be measuring a different domain within 
the nature of science. 
Tests on the nature of science have often presented an 
unrealistic picture of the scientific enterprise as a value-
free endeavour. Scientists are often characterized as open-
minded and unbiased. Lucas (1975) quotes from Kimball's 
(1967) model: 
Science has the unique attribute of openness, both 
openness of mind, allowing for willingness to change 
opinion in the face of evidence, and openness of the 
realm of investigation, unlimited by such factors as 
religion, politics and geography. (p. 111-112) 
Lucas refutes this position by citing several examples from 
the history of science where prominent scientists have been 
less than open-minded. 
Some instruments that attempt to appraise conceptions 
of the nature of scientific knowledge may not only test 
epistemology, but also reading comprehension and vocabulary. 
The following statements from The Wisconsin Inventory of 
Science Processes demonstrate the need for high school 
students to have ample ability in this area: 
1. Inductive logic is more likely to yield valid 
conclusions than is deductive logic. 
2. Hypotheses in science seldom have their origin in 
"speculative ideas," "inspired guesses," or 
"intuitive hunches". 
Without an adequate understanding of terms such as 
"inductive", "deductive", "hypotheses", "speculative", and 
"intuitive", student responses to these items would have 
little meaning. 
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Since important decisions are to be made on the basis 
of test scores from these instruments, potential users must 
be aware of their short-comings. Results from these tests 
must be used with prudence. Comparisons among different 
samples and different tests are difficult indeed. 
Conceptual limitations. Despite the abundance of 
literature, there continues to be major barriers to research 
in the test development area. The most serious is the lack 
of standards for defining an adequate conception of 
scientific knowledge. If we look to the experts we will not 
find a consensus. Philosophers of science do not agree on 
the exact nature of science and there is no universally 
accepted model of the nature of scientific knowledge. 
Educational researchers develop tests based on their own 
conceptions which do not necessarily correlate with tests 
created by other researchers. With no widely accepted 
standards, researchers judge conceptions to be adequate or 
inadequate on the basis of test scores. Scores judged best 
match the particular conceptions of the test developer, 
while alternate, but perhaps valid, conceptions are judged 
poorly. Thus, through this fundamental discrepancy, the 
validity of the whole research area is called into question. 
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student cognitive development and language. Another 
problem with research in the area is the lack of recognition 
by researchers of the level of cognitive development of 
students whose conceptions are being evaluated. It seems 
that the cognitive development of even young children is 
assumed to be advanced enough to be able to understand 
abstract philosophical concepts. Is it reasonable to assume 
that school children have an adequate conception of anything 
when compared to adult experts in the field? 
In a study conducted by Rubba, Horner, and Smith 
(1981), the authors set out to determine the degree to which 
grade seven and eight students believed the misconceptions 
that (a) scientific research reveals incontrovertible, 
absolute truth, and (b) that scientific theories eventually 
mature into laws. Their sample was 102 students attending a 
science fair. The instrument used was a Likert-type 
questionnaire developed by the authors. No reliability or 
validity data was provided for the questionnaire, except to 
say that the questionnaire was validated as it was 
developed. The authors found the questionnaire failed to 
discriminate from the neutral responses to any great degree. 
They concluded that the subjects did not understand the 
nature of science well enough to appreciate the tentative 
nature of scientific knowledge, and that they did not 
understand that laws and theories are two distinct types of 
explanations. From the results of this study a reasonable 
question might be: Should we expect students as young as 
those in grade seven and eight to have an understanding of 
the abstract nature of scientific knowledge? Ironically, 
the subjects of this study were high ability, science 
oriented students. One can assume that average ability 
students would have an even poorer understanding of these 
sophisticated concepts. 
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It seems apparent from recent research that students' 
language may lead researchers to misrepresent their 
conceptions. Lederman and O'Malley (1990) used a novel 
methodology to determine beliefs about the tentativeness of 
scientific knowledge. A total of 69 subjects in grades 9 -
12 completed open-ended questionnaires that categorized 
their view of science as tentative or absolutist. Twenty of 
these students participated in follow-up videotaped 
interviews. 
Results from the questionnaire indicated that students 
possessed an absolutist view of scientific knowledge. 
However, results from the interview showed that students' 
language had led researchers to make critical 
misinterpretations about the students' beliefs. For 
example, students used words like "prove" to mean "providing 
evidence for" instead of using the word in the absolute 
sense. The authors concluded that responses given by 
students using pencil and paper tests are subject to 
multiple interpretations and therefore the interactive data 
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collection of the interview is recommended when determining 
student conceptions. As noted previously, Aikenhead (1987) 
also ascertained that students have quite different meanings 
for common scientific terms and phrases. Munby (1982) 
describes this situation in which researchers assume that 
their perception of an item corresponds to the students' as 
"the doctrine of immaculate perception". In light of these 
findings, researchers who must, due to practical 
limitations, use pencil and paper tests only, should ensure 
that tests are soundly and validly constructed, and results 
from these tests should be interpreted cautiously. 
An interesting finding of Lederman and O'Malley {1990) 
was the fact that many students admitted having no prior 
thoughts about the issues raised on the questionnaire. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to believe that some students form 
their conceptions of scientific knowledge at the time they 
are completing the test or questionnaire. If this "test 
effect" is the case, the assessment procedure may be 
actually creating the students' views it is purporting to 
measure. 
Due to these significant problems, there is the 
disturbing possibility that tests on the nature of 
scientific knowledge are less valid than originally thought. 
Thus, research findings should be accepted cautiously and 
with considerable scrutiny. 
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selection Based on Existing Instruments 
Of the instruments examined, the NSKS came closest to 
fulfilling the theoretical requirements of this study. Its 
specific focus on the nature of scientific knowledge and its 
rigorous development process are its assets. The problem 
with the NSKS is that it does not address several dimensions 
of scientific knowledge. Specifically, the nature of 
scientific truth, the fallibility of scientific knowledge, 
the role of authority in acquiring scientific knowledge, and 
the speed or rate at which the knowledge is acquired, are 
not part of Rubba's theoretical model. Since there is 
evidence that these dimensions affect the reasoning process, 
the decision was made to develop a questionnaire to include 
them. A detailed description of the development of the 
epistemological questionnaire will appear in chapter IV. 
Implications of Limitations of Existing Instruments for 
Epistemological Questionnaire Development 
The most significant implications for questionnaire 
development concern the assumptions about the adequacy of 
various conceptions of the nature of science. Due to a lack 
of consensus on what constitutes adequate conceptions, no 
philosophical model on which items are based can be 
considered the only correct and valid interpretation of the 
nature of scientific knowledge. 
The present questionnaire does not attempt to define or 
determine adequate conceptions. A philosophical framework 
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that allows expression of alternate conceptions within major 
dimensions of scientific knowledge will be provided as the 
basis of the questionnaire. The study takes a neutral 
stance with regard to which philosophical conceptions are 
correct. 
Results of the present questionnaire will be 
interpreted with cognizance of (a) the level of cognitive 
sophistication of the subjects, and (b) the possibility of 
multiple interpretations of the questionnaire statements. 
It is assumed that high school students do not have a 
sophisticated understanding of the philosophical concepts 
related to the nature of scientific knowledge and that their 
understanding of philosophical terminology is limited. It 
is also assumed that multiple interpretations of items are 
likely, and as such, measures will be taken to limit them, 
including the completion of a pilot version of the 
questionnaire and the use of subjects' comments about the 
questionnaire statements and wording. 
Inductive Reasoning Ability 
Inductive reasoning ability has been studied since the 
early stages of intelligence testing resulting in a rather 
extensive body of research. Ropo (1987) in his review 
describes induction as having been studied from two 
different perspectives. One major focus has been on concept 
formation including strategies and errors in hypothesis 
formation. Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) were among 
45 
the first to begin this type of work. A second approach 
uses intelligence tasks such as classification, analogy, and 
series completion to analyse cognitive processes. This 
approach was introduced by Cronbach (1957) and later 
reinitiated by Glaser (1972). The first perspective most 
closely matches the methodology of this study. 
Variables Correlating with Inductive Reasoning 
Comparisons of the inductive reasoning skills of 
different age groups have generally found improved reasoning 
ability for older children. Sternberg and Rifkin (1979} 
discovered differences in solution times of analogy problems 
when they compared individuals 8, 10, 12 and 19 years old. 
Older children were able to manage the tasks more quickly 
than the younger children. They also found qualitative 
differences, with younger subjects using different processes 
than older subjects. Similar results were obtained by 
Sternberg and Nigro (1980} who, in addition, noted that 
process differences could be generalized to two separate 
performance levels; one characterizing the performance of 
9 - 12 year-olds and the other characterizing 15 - 18 year 
olds. Goldman, Pellegrino, Parseghian, and Sallis (1982) 
reinforced these results when they found 10-year-old 
children were more accurate in inference and application 
processes than 8-year-olds. 
Inductive reasoning differences in individuals of the 
same age have been largely studied by comparing skilled and 
less skilled reasoners (Rope, 1987). Skilled reasoners 
process faster (Sternberg, 1977; Mulholland, Pellegrino, & 
Glaser, 1980) and are more accurate in executing the 
reasoning process (Alderton, Goldman, & Pelligrino, 1982; 
Whitely, 1980). 
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Pelligrino and Glaser (1982) found that differences in 
speed and accuracy of problem solving were due to 
individuals' memory management or knowledge base. They 
discovered several interrelated factors that seem to 
distinguish between good and poor reasoners. Poor reasoners 
lose information through poor memory management, have less 
knowledge of task restraints, and have lower-order 
conceptions of numbers and mathematical rules. 
Gettys and Engelmann (1983) in their research on 
generating plans and hypotheses found that subjects 
typically fall short in their efforts to explore hypotheses 
fully or to explain thoroughly a situation. Subjects seem 
to overrate the extent to which they exhaust an issue and 
thus stop prematurely. Perkins et al. (1983) characterized 
these learners as "make-sense epistemologists". That is, 
they analyze a situation only to the point where it makes 
superficial sense. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1985) also 
addressed this phenomenon by concluding that students access 
only a fraction of their knowledge that relates to a 
specific topic. 
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Perkins {1985) carried out a study on informal 
reasoning ability involving 320 high school students, 
college students, non-students with a high school diploma, 
and non-students with a bachelor's degree. Even though the 
area of informal reasoning is somewhat broader than that of 
pure induction, the results raise some intriguing questions. 
Subjects participated in interviews in which they were 
presented with s everal issues about which they were to 
develop conclusions and provide arguments to support their 
conclusions. Through the interviews an estimate of the 
subjects' level of background knowledge was ascertained. 
After the interviews all subjects were given IQ tests. 
Perkins concluded IQ was the most significant variable 
influencing informal reasoning ability. Prior knowledge was 
considered to be of minor significance. Contrary to the 
studies mentioned previously, Perkins found age to have no 
significant impact. When one cautiously combines the 
results of all these studies it appears that age is much 
more significant when dealing with younger subjects. As one 
might expect due to maturational factors, when subjects 
approach adulthood the differences in reasoning ability 
appear to be much less dramatic. 
Perkins' most startling finding was that the number of 
years of education the subject completed was only borderline 
significant and seemed to have little effect on reasoning 
ability. If these results are valid, this study has 
widespread ramifications for the educational field. 
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Should 
we continue to support a system of higher education that 
does little to make individuals better thinkers? 
Tests of Critical Thinking and Inductive Reasoning 
The design of the present study necessitates use of an 
instrument that accurately appraises inductive reasoning 
strategies. Several instruments, most containing induction 
as a component of critical thinking, were examined to 
determine their suitability for this study. What follows is 
a brief description of these instruments' characteristics 
and use. For an extensive analysis of most tests of 
critical thinking and their components, the reader should 
refer to Ennis and Norris {1989). 
Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal - Forms A 
and B. Developed by Watson and Glaser (1980), this 80 item 
test is perhaps the most widely used of all critical 
thinking tests. It contains sections on inference, 
assumption identification, deduction, interpretation, and 
argument evaluation. For the section on inference, the 
subject is to select one of five points on a true-false 
continuum. For the remaining sections, subjects are to 
select one of two choices: that an assumption was made or 
not made, that a conclusion follows or does not follow, or 
that an argument is strong or weak. Test reliability data 
include a test-retest estimate of 0.73 determined with a 
sample of 96 college students. Evidence of the test's 
validity was drawn from several unnamed studies. 
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New Jersey Test of Reasoning Skills. This test is a 
so-item multiple choice test of reasoning and inquiry skills 
developed by Shipman (1983}. The target range of the test 
is from grade 5 to college level. The test deals with 
topics including assumption identification, induction, 
classical syllogism, and the meaning of categorical 
statements. Reliability estimates of 0.84 and 0.91 are 
provided for samples of grade five and seven students. 
Information related to the test's validity is not provided. 
Cornell Critical Thinking Test, Level X. This 71 item 
multiple-choice test was created by Ennis and Millman 
(1985}. It is designed to be administered in a 50 minute 
period and includes sections on induction, credibility, 
observation, deduction, and assumption identification. The 
test is designed for use in elementary, junior high, high 
school, and beginning years of university. Reliability 
estimates using Spearman-Brown and Kuder-Richardson formulas 
range from 0.67 to 0.90. Content was validated by members 
of the Illinois Critical Thinking Project. 
Cornell Critical Thinking Test, Level Z. This version 
of the Cornell test contains 52 items and has a target range 
from gifted high school students to students of college 
level. Its use of difficult language makes it inappropriate 
for use with elementary or junior high students. 
Reliability estimates on the Level Z range from 0.50 to 
0.77. 
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Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test. This test was 
developed by Ennis and Weir (1985). It is a standardized 
essay test whose target range is grade 7 through college. 
Essays are graded according to criteria which include 
getting the point, recognizing reasons and assumptions, 
seeing other possibilities and explanations, and responding 
to overgeneralization, credibility problems, and the use of 
emotional language to persuade. The test is most 
appropriate for high school and college students. Inter-
rater reliability with two samples of 27 and 28 students was 
recorded at 0.86 and 0.82. Content validity is demonstrated 
by a close match between the test problems and Ennis's 
conception of critical thinking. 
Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies. This 
test was constructed by Norris and Ryan (1987a). Subjects 
must imagine they are searching for alien creatures on an 
fictitious planet. They must use clues that are available 
to explain how they would search for living creatures. 
Norris and Ryan have provided a model for ideal reasoning in 
the situation and student reasoning is measured against that 
ideal. In addition to assessing strategies, the test also 
attempts to address the very difficult concept of measuring 
student dispositions. Test development is not complete and 
as such inter-rater reliabilities and processes of 
validation have not been published. 
Limitations of Existing Tests 
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In the past decade, many authors have addressed the 
shortcomings of present tests of reasoning and general 
critical thinking ability (McPeck, 1981; Ennis, 1984; 
Quellmalz, 1985; Whimbey, 1985; Norris, 1988a; Norris, 
1988b; Ennis & Norris, 1989; Nickerson, 1989b; Norris, 
1990). This section will focus on limitations of inductive 
reasoning tests and will be based primarily on the ideas of 
Ennis (1984), Ennis & Norris (1989), Norris (1986), and 
Norris (1988b). It will deal primarily with test format and 
problems of reliability, validity, and multiple 
interpretations of test items and instructions. 
Machine-scorable vs. essay test format. There is 
considerable debate among test developers as to the merits 
of machine-scorable and essay type critical thinking tests. 
Early tests were strictly machine-scorable, but more 
recently there is an emphasis on the essay and interview 
format. 
Tests that are machine-scorable include those that use 
multiple-choice questioning, Likert-type position 
statements, and true-false continuums. The major advantages 
of these types of tests is that they are much easier and 
economical to use. Ennis and Norris (1989) estimate that 
machine-scorable tests are economically superior by a factor 
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of about 1000 when compared to a test such as the Ennis-Weir 
Critical Thinking Essay Test. Being quicker and easier to 
grade, machine-scorable tests have the added advantage of 
allowing larger sample sizes. To some degree machine-
scorable tests can be graded more objectively than essay 
type tests. This is not to say that machine-scorable tests 
are totally objective. As Ennis and Norris (1989) point 
out, the choice of items on a machine-scorable test, the 
interpretation of the score, and the criterion set for 
mastery, are all at least as subjective as using an essay. 
Ennis and Norris (1989} describe three problems related 
to the validity of machine-scorable tests. First, machine-
scorable tests show only the final product of the reasoning. 
The process by which the answer is derived is really what 
the test developer is interested in, but it must be inferred 
that the appropriate answer choice means the correct 
reasoning process. But, for instance, it is not certain 
that the background assumptions the subject uses to reason 
through a problem are the same as the assumptions of the 
examiner. Thus the subject can arrive at the correct 
response for alternative reasons or at an incorrect response 
via appropriate reasoning processes. 
Second, machine-scorable tests do not seem able to test 
the creative aspects of critical thinking. Frederiksen 
(1984) found low correlations between parallel open-ended 
and machine-scorable tests of hypothesis formulating. 
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The third problem is that machine-scorable tests do not 
effectively test critical thinking dispositions. Ennis and 
Norris (1989) define dispositions as what individuals have a 
tendency to do on account of their nature. They explain 
that individuals may have critical thinking abilities but 
may not be disposed to use them. An example of a critical 
thinking disposition might be the tendency to be open-
minded. The disposition to act is difficult to evaluate 
effectively on any test, but particularly so on a machine-
scorable test since the examiner sees only the product of 
the reasoning process. Ennis and Norris point out that this• 
deficiency is particularly acute when dealing with poor 
responses. How can it be determined if a poor response is 
due to the student's lack of ability or lack of disposition 
to use the ability? 
In addition, because of the test situation, subjects 
may perform the appropriate behaviour without normally beingr 
disposed to do so. Subjects may not normally be open-
minded, for example, but may appear that way in a test 
situation if they perceive it to be the appropriate 
response. 
Essay testing allows the examiner to see, at least to 
some degree, the reasoning process and the background 
assumptions made. The process is not fool-proof, however, 
as Ennis and Norris (1989) point out: "Essay tests only 
invite justification, but do not provide for further 
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interaction when the student's justification itself is in 
need of clarification or justification" (p. 50). In the 
Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies, Norris {1990) 
notes that since students are not told what criteria will be 
used to grade their responses, they may not give reasons for 
what they write. Desired responses may be present or absent 
for reasons other than those inferred by the examiner. As 
an example, Norris points out that critical thinking 
dispositions may not be exhibited because the individual may 
not have appropriate subject-specific knowledge. Thus the 
examiner is still unable to clearly isolate the subject's 
dispositions. 
The biggest drawback to using essay-type questioning, 
apart from its uneconomical qualities, is generally poor 
reliability. Since essay answers have to be interpreted by 
the examiner, a major concern is that different examiners 
are unable to score essay tests consistently. Generally, 
developers have attempted to develop standardized scoring 
formats to produce higher inter-rater correlations. 
Reliability. Ennis (1984) provides an in-depth 
appraisal of the use of estimates of reliability for tests 
of reasoning and critical thinking. He points out that for 
practical considerations most test developers use measures 
of internal consistency (eg. the Kuder-Richardson formulas) 
as measures of reliability. He argues that items on a 
critical thinking test may not and perhaps should not be 
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inter-correlated, since the ability to think critically may 
be heterogeneous. The degree to which critical thinking is 
homogeneous is the degree to which we should expect internal 
consistency. It is possible, as noted by Norris (1986), 
that a test could have a high test-retest reliability but a 
low measure of internal consistency. In addition, it is 
clear that measures of internal consistency can be 
manipulated by simply increasing or decreasing the number of 
test items. Larger numbers of items will increase the 
reliability estimates but not necessarily the test quality. 
Validity. Establishing the validity of a test of 
inductive reasoning or critical thinking is very difficult 
indeed. Criterion-based validity depending on criteria 
already accepted as valid is impossible, since none exist 
(Ennis, 1984). Content validity is usually established by 
seeking a consensus among experts. Though this may be the 
best means available, universal agreement on such a complex 
topic as critical thinking or its components is very rare. 
In fact, one can argue that the truth does not necessarily 
reside with the majority. 
Multiple interpretations. Ennis and Norris (1989) 
describe two problems especially pronounced in tests of 
inductive reasoning. First, induction testing depends on 
examinees having a set of background assumptions that are 
the same, or largely the same, as those of the test 
developer. However, a subject may base his or her response 
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on assumptions different from those of the test developer 
and reasonably arrive at answers different from the response 
keyed correct. Second, subjects with different levels of 
sophistication may give different levels of support to a 
conclusion. In some cases, persons with a high level of 
sophistication may not accept conclusions that the test 
developer considers acceptable because they may feel they do 
not know enough to reach a definite conclusion. Thus, they 
have used correct processes to arrive at an answer they will 
be penalized for. Ennis and Norris (1989) describe several 
examples of both types of problems from the Watson-Glaser 
Critical Thinking Appraisal and the Cornell Critical 
Thinking Tests. 
Other factors affecting test quality. Alternate 
subject interpretations of tests can also be a result of 
other factors. McPeck (1981) suggests the induction items 
on the Cornell Critical Thinking Test, Level Z are questions 
of reading comprehension. Clearly, if subjects do not 
understand terms or the meaning of a complete statement it 
will have a bearing on the student response. 
Norris (1986) points out that subject interpretation of 
instructions will have a direct impact on the validity of a 
test. He specifically refers to the Ennis-Weir Critical 
Thinking Essay Test and notes that according to the test's 
instructions the subjects are to critique the thinking of 
the author of a passage. From a study completed by Norris 
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and a colleague, it appeared that a large proportion of 
subjects responded to the content of the letter rather than 
the author's thinking processes. students were not 
evaluating how someone was thinking but rather what someone 
was thinking, therefore calling into question the validity 
of the test as a whole. 
Norris (1986) points out that critical thinking tests, 
for the most part, represent artificial situations which try 
to isolate single components of the critical thinking 
process. The degree to which critical thinking abilities in 
the complex real-world carry over to isolated manufactured 
situations is an interesting question. 
Ennis and Norris {1989) note there are no clear ways to 
measure critical thinking dispositions or the willingness to 
use critical thinking abilities. A subject may respond to 
an item in the desired way when prompted in a test 
situation, but this is not a true indication of what the 
individual is normally disposed to do. 
It is apparent that if educators are to base 
decisions on test scores from critical thinking tests they 
must do so very cautiously. They must recognize the 
particular limitations of test format and the limitations 
imposed by our present understanding of the concept of 
critical thinking. 
58 
selection Based on Existing Tests 
The Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning strategies 
(Norris & Ryan, 1987a) was selected as the measure of 
reasoning skills for this study. Besides being the only 
test examined that tests inductive reasoning specifically, 
it has several features that are considered appropriate for 
this study. First, to complete the test, the subject is 
placed in a dynamic role and must actively employ inductive 
reasoning strategies. Second, the imaginary situation 
created in the test (searching for living creatures on 
planet Zed) requires little, if any, specialized background 
knowledge that will affect subjects' responses. Third, the 
essay type test allows the examiner to infer with greater 
accuracy the mental processes being used by the subject. A 
detailed discussion of this test will appear in the next 
chapter on methodology. 
Epistemology and Thinking 
As described in the previous chapter there is 
considerable theoretical support for the premise that a 
relationship exists between an individual's beliefs about 
the nature of knowledge, or "personal epistemology", and how 
that individual uses that knowledge. For example, Anderson 
{1984) points out that student epistemological beliefs may 
provide an explanation as to why some students integrate 
information and others do not. Spiro, Vispoel, Schmitz, 
Samarapungavan, and Boerger {1987) state that epistemology 
may explain why some students oversimplify information and 
others do not. Several authors have developed conceptual 
frameworks of human cognition containing epistemological 
components (Perkins & Simmons, 1988; Posner et al., 1982; 
Schoenfeld, 1983). Surprisingly, there is very little 
experimental support for these ideas. The section that 
follows will discuss the literature, both theoretical and 
experimental, that provides motivation for this study. 
Theoretical Framework 
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As stated in the previous chapter, Posner et al. (1982) 
emphasize the role of epistemological beliefs in the 
conceptual change process. They propose that an 
individual's current concepts, or "conceptual ecology", will 
influence the development of a new concept. They describe 
conceptual change as a result of five primary determinants: 
1. anomalies: ideas that fail are important for 
selecting their successors. 
2. analogies and metaphor: these suggest new ideas and 
make them intelligible. 
3. epistemological commitments: 
a. explanatory ideals - subject-matter specific 
views with norms for successful explanations 
in the field. 
b. general views about the character of 
knowledge - standards for successful 
knowledge such as parsimony and economy. 
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4. metaphysical beliefs and concepts: 
a. metaphysical beliefs about science - beliefs 
about the orderliness, symmetry and 
nonrandomness of the universe. 
b. metaphysical concepts of science - beliefs 
about the nature of the universe. 
5. Other knowledge: 
a. knowledge in other fields 
b. competing concepts - selection of a new 
concept requires that it is an improvement on 
its competitors. 
The belief that epistemological commitments directly 
influence the formation of new concepts lends theoretical 
support to the link between epistemology and reasoning. 
Standards for successful knowledge determine if information 
is believed, dismissed, or ignored. Within a discipline, 
norms for successful explanations influence how one will use 
inference, and determine if a conclusion drawn is justified. 
Also, metaphysical beliefs about science and the universe, 
described by the authors as an influencing factor on concept 
formation, affect one's personal epistemology. One's 
conception of scientific knowledge and scientific truth is 
encompassed by one's view of the universe. Metaphysical 
beliefs provide the context within which thought and 
reasoning take place. 
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Schoenfeld (1983) explores the way that belief systems 
shape people's behaviour as they solve problems. He has 
developed a framework for human problem-solving which 
includes three qualitatively different categories of 
knowledge and behaviour. They are: 
1. resources - knowledge including facts and 
competencies possessed by the 
individual, that can be brought to bear 
on the problem at hand. 
2. control - selection and implementation of 
resources. 
3. belief systems - determinants of an 
individual's behaviour. These 
determinants can be conscious or 
unconscious and include beliefs about 
the individual, the environment, the 
topic and about the discipline. 
Schoenfeld argues that the network of beliefs about 
oneself, the task, and about the nature of the discipline 
itself provides the context within which problems are solved 
and conclusions produced. In addition, understanding the 
context is essential to accurately interpret the conclusions 
drawn. He states: 
Beliefs about the very nature of facts and procedures 
will determine students' performance. The student who 
believes that mathematical knowledge must be remembered 
will be stymied when a particular object is forgotten, 
while another who believes that the procedure can be 
derived will act rather differently. (p. 350) 
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Perkins and Simmons (1988) offer strong support for the 
relationship between epistemology and reasoning. Their 
discussion of learning, as influenced by an interaction of 
different types of knowledge, provides an important 
theoretical base for this study. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, they propose four different categories or 
"frames" of student understanding. Briefly, they are: (a) 
the content frame, (b) the problem-solving frame, (c) the 
inquiry frame, and (d) the epistemic frame. The epistemic 
frame includes the norms by which knowledge is acquired and 
used. With regard to epistemology, their work parallels 
that of Posner et al. (1982) and Schoenfeld (1983). 
Epistemology provides the rules by which knowledge is used. 
They claim it is an oversimplification that knowledge 
and understanding are acquired through information and 
practice. Deeper understanding is a result of an awareness 
of the relationships that connect content knowledge with 
knowledge in the problem-solving, inquiry, and epistemic 
frames. They urge that the educational community as a whole 
must shift the perspective of learning and understanding to 
encompass epistemic considerations. 
Newmann (1988) explains that any theoretical framework 
of higher order thinking requires a component more 
fundamental than knowledge or skills. It requires what he 
calls dispositions of thoughtfulness. Dispositions have 
been mentioned previously and have been discussed at length 
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by Norris (1985b} and Walsh and Paul {1987}. They include 
such attitudes and personality traits as: (a) possessing a 
desire that claims be supported by reasons and that those 
reasons be scrutinized, (b) having a tendency to be 
reflective rather than blindly accepting the views of 
others, (c) having a curiosity to explore new questions, and 
(d) having the flexibility to seek alternate solutions. 
Newmann states that dispositions also involve general 
values and beliefs about the nature of knowledge, such as 
beliefs that rationality is desirable and that knowledge is 
socially constructed, often indeterminate, and tentative. 
An awareness of these epistemological concerns is necessary 
for an understanding of higher order thought processes. 
Though there are some specific differences in the 
conceptual frameworks discussed, there is extensive 
agreement that epistemology plays an important role in the 
cognitive process. In this context, it seems quite 
reasonable to expect a relationship between students' 
conceptions of scientific knowledge and their reasoning 
strategies. 
Experimental Support 
An extensive review of the literature revealed only a 
few studies that attempted to determine specifically 
students' epistemological beliefs. A single study was found 
that tried to isolate students' epistemological beliefs and 
to relate them to their comprehension. Schommer (1989} 
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attempted to isolate different dimensions of students' 
personal epistemology and to relate these dimensions to 
their comprehension of a passage for which the students were 
to write a concluding paragraph. Since the literature 
search did not reveal any studies that attempted to isolate 
epistemological beliefs and relate them to inductive 
reasoning ability specifically, Schommer's work provides 
important practical support and will be discussed in detail. 
The seminal work on students' personal epistemology was 
performed by William Perry in a study of college students 
(1968). Through a questionnaire and in-depth interviews 
Perry developed a scheme that included nine stages of 
epistemological development. He claimed that students move 
from a position of believing that knowledge is either right 
or wrong, certain, and handed down from authority, to the 
position characterized by an understanding that there are 
multiple possibilities for knowledge and that all knowledge 
is constructed. 
Schommer (1989) reports that subsequent research based 
on Perry's work has been inconsistent and contradictory. 
She submits the problem is with Perry's unidimensional 
conception of epistemological beliefs. Her proposal is that 
epistemological beliefs can be subdivided into at least five 
more or less independent dimensions: (a) the structure of 
knowledge, (b) the certainty of knowledge, (c) the source of 
knowledge, (d) the control of knowledge, and (e) the speed 
of knowledge acquisition. 
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In her own study Schommer (1989} used a sample of 86 
junior college students to test the effects of epistemology 
on comprehension. First, the subjects completed an 
epistemology questionnaire. Then they were asked to write 
the concluding paragraph to a passage. Subjects completed a 
ten-item mastery test on each passage and a confidence scale 
was administered. Subjects' prior knowledge was indicated 
by the number of classes they had taken in a courses 
relevant to the passages they had to read. 
The results indicated that subjects who believed 
knowledge was acquired quickly tended to (a) make 
oversimplified conclusions, (b) perform poorly on the 
mastery test, and (c) overestimate their level of 
understanding as indicated on the confidence scale. 
Subjects who believed knowledge is certain rather than 
tentative tended to make what they believed to be certain 
conclusions. 
The educational implications of Schommer's findings are 
quite significant. If appropriate epistemological beliefs 
can be learned through explicit instruction, then 
comprehension potentially can be improved. As Schommer 
points out, future research needs to test the 
generalizability of the effects of epistemological beliefs 
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on different tasks, different domains, and different aspects 
of comprehension. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to assess the current status 
of research in the areas of conceptions of the nature of 
scientific knowledge and inductive reasoning. It is clear 
that there has been much research completed that is relevant 
to this study. 
With regard to students' conceptions of scientific 
knowledge, the research generally indicates that students' 
conceptions are inadequate. The most convincing evidence 
has come from researchers such as Welch (1981} and Aikenhead 
(1987}. Through the work of Robinson (1969}, Lederman 
(1986b, 1986c), and others, teachers' conceptions and their 
effect on students' conceptions have been examined. These 
studies have produced somewhat inconclusive results. Many 
researchers believe the philosophical view portrayed in 
curricular materials is outdated and a source of student 
misconceptions regarding the nature of scientific knowledge 
(Duschl, 1988; Hodson, 1986a, 1986b, 1988; Norris, 1985a, in 
press). 
Many instruments are available to test conceptions of 
the nature of science generally, but few instruments, with 
the exception of Rubba's (1976}, are devoted specifically to 
testing the nature of scientific knowledge. Limitations of 
these instruments include: (a) lack of agreement by 
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philosophers on a model of the nature of scientific 
knowledge, (b) basis in outdated philosophical models, (c) 
lack of a definition of an adequate conception of scientific 
knowledge, (d) lack of recognition of the level of cognitive 
development of young students and of different possible 
interpretations of language, and (e) poor construction 
containing difficult terminology. It was judged that none 
of the instruments examined would be appropriate for use in 
this study, so the development of an epistemological 
questionnaire was considered necessary. 
With regard to inductive reasoning ability, the 
research indicates that these skills are also inadequate. 
Generally, it has been found that student reasoning is 
characterized by an unwillingness or inability to deeply 
analyse problems (Perkins et al., 1983; Schoenfeld, 1983, 
1985). 
Several tests of critical thinking exist that contain 
inductive reasoning as a component. These include ones by 
Ennis and Millman {1985), Ennis and Weir {1985), and 
Shipman (1983). As with tests of knowledge conceptions, 
tests of critical thinking and inductive reasoning have 
numerous limitations. These include: (a) conceptual 
problems of using measures of internal consistency as 
measures of reliability, (b) problems with determining 
validity, and (c) the problem of background assumptions and 
multiple interpretations. The Essay Test of Inductive 
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Reasoning Strategies, Part A was selected as the measure of 
reasoning for the study. 
There is a great deal of support for the theoretical 
relationship between epistemology and reasoning (Newmann, 
1988; Perkins & Simmons, 1988; Posner et al., 1982; 
Schoenfeld, 1983). Basically, the relationship can be 
summarized by stating that the rules and norms that govern 
the acquisition of knowledge influence how that knowledge is 
used in the reasoning process. However, with the exception 
of work by Schommer (1989), there is relatively little 
experimental support for the relationship. It is the belief 
of this investigator that knowledge about student 
epistemology has been a neglected area of educational 
research and can provide valuable insight into the reasoning 
process. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
The Nature of the causal Model 
The theoretical model tested in this study is presented 
in Figure 3.1. The model depicts the causal relationships 
among conceptions of scientific knowledge, inductive 
reasoning, and science achievement. The model proposes how 
these three variables vary together, that is, how a change 
in the value of any one variable will affect the values of 
the other variables. 
Knowledge 
Conception 
~-----------, 
Inductive 
Reasoning 
~~~ 
Science 
Achievement 
~ 
Figure 3.1. Theoretical model of causal 
relationships among conceptions of 
scientific knowledge, inductive reasoning, 
and achievement in science. 
The following relationships are proposed: (a) that 
students' conceptions of scientific knowledge will directly 
affect their achievement in science, (b) that students' 
conceptions of scientific knowledge will directly affect 
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their inductive reasoning, (c) that students' inductive 
reasoning will directly affect their achievement in science, 
and, consequently, (d) that students' conceptions of 
scientific knowledge will indirectly affect their 
achievement in science through changes in inductive 
reasoning. 
The model is derived from the assumption of Newmann 
( 1988) , Perkins and Simmons ( 1988) , Posner et al. ( 1982) , 
and Schoenfeld (1983, 1985), that beliefs about the nature 
of knowledge will influence how that knowledge is used. 
Varying conceptions will cause differences in how one 
performs mental tasks, including inductive reasoning. 
Students who are better able to perform mental tasks should 
achieve better in science courses. The findings of Schommer 
(1989), that conceptions of the nature of knowledge 
influence comprehension, provide empirical support for the 
relationships proposed in the model. 
The Nature of Related Variables 
Within the context of the model, students' conception 
of scientific knowledge is an independent or predetermined 
variable. Thus, the total variation in conceptions of 
scientific knowledge is assumed to be caused by variables 
outside the model. This type of variable is called 
"exogenous" (Land, 1969). The remaining variables, 
inductive reasoning, and achievement in science, are taken 
as dependent or "endogenous" (Wright, 1934; Land, 1969). 
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The variation of the endogenous variables is assumed to be 
determined by a combination of the prior exogenous or 
endogenous variables and a "residual'' variable. In other 
words, the variation in science achievement is assumed to be 
determined by inductive reasoning and conception of 
scientific knowledge, as well as by influences from outside 
the proposed model. The residual variable is assumed not to 
be correlated with the set of variables immediately 
determining the endogenous variable under consideration and 
it accounts for the variance of the endogenous variable not 
explained by the prior measured variables (Land, 1969). 
Assumptions of the Model 
In proposing the causal model, I make three basic 
assumptions. First, all relationships are linear. Changes 
in one variable always occur as a linear function of changes 
in other variables. That is, the equations used to describe 
the relationships are those in which the value of one 
variable is defined simply in terms of a linear combination 
of the values of the other variables (Heise, 1969). 
Second, it is assumed the model is recursive. That is, 
the system of variables contains no reciprocal causation or 
feedback loops. The direction of effects are assumed to be 
away from the exogenous variable: conceptions affect 
achievement, but achievement does not affect conceptions, 
either directly, or through reasoning. 
72 
Third, the variables are assumed to be continuously 
acting. As a result, the instruments that measure them must 
do so on an interval scale. Imposing dichotomies or 
treating the variables as ordinal would be inappropriate 
since these interpretations imply that the variable behaves 
in an all-or-nothing fashion (Land, 1969}. 
Statistical Analysis 
The first two research questions about students' 
conceptions of the nature of scientific knowledge and their 
inductive reasoning strategies will be answered using 
descriptive statistics. The final three research questions, 
as well as the hypotheses proposed, attempt to identify 
causal interrelationships between the three variables of 
conceptions of scientific knowledge, inductive reasoning, 
and science achievememt. These questions will be analyzed 
by two correlational ~ethods. First, the Pearson product-
moment correlations f~r all variables will be determined. 
Second, the evidence ~or the strength of causal 
relationships will be examined using path analysis. 
Path Analysis 
Path analysis is a method of testing the validity of a 
theory about causal r •elationships among three or more 
variables that have been studied using a correlational 
research design (Borg & Gall, 1983}. The process is a 
method of decomposing and interpreting linear relationships 
among a set of variab•les assuming that (a} the causal 
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ordering among the variables is known, and (b) the 
relationships among the variables are causally closed (Kim, 
1975). 
The method of path analysis was originally developed by 
Wright (1921, 1934, 1954, 1960a, 1960b) in a series of 
general essays on data analysis in the field of genetics. 
Wright (1921) describes the purpose of a path analysis as: 
a method of measuring the direct influence along each 
separate path in such a system and thus finding the 
degree to which variation of a given effect is 
determined by each particular cause. The method 
depends on the combination of knowledge of the degree 
of correlation among the variables in a system with 
such knowledge as may be possessed of the causal 
relations. In cases in which the causal relations are 
uncertain, the method can be used to find the logical 
consequences of any particular hypothesis in regard to 
them. ( p . 55 7 ) 
Borg and Gall {1983) describe three fundamental steps 
to complete a path analysis. The first step is to formulate 
a theory that causally links the variables of interest. 
Then measures for the variables must be selected. The final 
step is to compute the path coefficients to show the 
strength of the relationship between each of the pairs of 
variables that are causally linked. Path coefficients 
generated from the analysis are typically standardized 
regression coefficients indicating the direct effect of one 
variable on another. Wright (1934) describes path 
coefficients as: 
the fraction of the standard deviation of the 
endogenous variable for which the designated variable 
is directly responsible in the sense of the fraction 
which would be found if this factor varies to the same 
extent as in the observed data while all other 
variables are constant. (p.l62) 
Thus, the path coefficients between an independent and 
dependent variable indicates the expected changes in the 
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dependent variable when the independent variable is actually 
changed by one standard deviation and all other independent 
variables are held constant. 
A major advantage of a path analysis is that it allows 
identification of direct and indirect effects of the 
independent and intervening variables upon dependent 
variables. In the causal model presented in this study, the 
indirect effect is that part of the total effect of 
conception of scientific knowledge on science achievement 
that works through the variable of inductive reasoning. 
Measures 
Epistemological Questionnaire 
The questionnaire to measure students conceptions of 
scientific knowledge consists of 56 Likert-type items 
compiled in the following seven subscales: (a) scientific 
truth, (b) the fallibility of scientific knowledge, (c) the 
changeability of scientific knowledge, (d) the role of 
creativity in scientific knowledge production, (e) the 
testability of scientific knowledge, (f) the speed of 
scientific knowledge acquisition, and (g) the role of 
authority in scientific knowledge production. The 
questionnaire was designed so that extremes of each subscale 
represent alternate conceptions. Since the questionnaire 
was constructed specifically for the present study, its 
development is discussed separately and in detail in the 
next chapter. 
Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies 
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In this test, subjects are to imagine they are on an 
imaginary planet "Zed" for four days. Subjects are told 
they must search planet Zed for living creatures. They are 
asked to read about the things that happen each day, and to 
think about what these events mean for their search. 
Subjects are then asked to write what they are thinking 
about the things that happened on that and previous days; 
and write what they plan to do on their search because those 
things happened. 
The events of each day are presented in sequence and 
subjects are not to go on to the next day until they have 
discussed what the events of the current day mean for their 
search and what they plan to do as a result of the 
information provided on the current day. Day 1 has been 
completed as an example for the examinees by the authors of 
the test. 
Theoretical framework. The test was designed within 
the context of Ennis's (1987) conception of critical 
thinking. Three types of inference are central to this 
conception: induction, deduction, and value judgement. 
Inductive inferences may be of two types: those that 
generalize information or those that explain information. 
The Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies, Part A 
focuses on inductive explanation. 
76 
The test manual describes seven strategies used in 
inductive reasoning: (a) recognizing relevant information, 
(b) seeking information when appropriate, (c) producing 
alternate conclusions or explanations, (d) withholding 
judgement, (e) monitoring progress, (f) being organized, and 
(g) staying focused. Table 3.1 provides a descriptive 
summary of the authors' comments (Norris & Ryan, 1987b, p.4) 
on the importance of each strategy to the concept of 
inductive reasoning. The order in which the strategies are 
presented is arbitrary, since different tasks require 
different strategies used in different sequences. 
Scoring. A detailed explanation of all scoring 
procedures, their rationale, and sample calculations of 
strategy, depth, and breadth scores (to be described 
subsequently) can be found in the test manual (Norris & 
Ryan, 1987b). The authors have provided scoring guides that 
incorporate models of ideal reasoning for each of the test 
days. They note that the scoring guide will provide 
considerable direction to the scorer but there is still a 
need for individual judgement and understanding of the 
reasoning required in the test situations. 
Table 3.1 
A Description of Inductive Reasoning Strategies 
Strategy Description 
1 All information is taken into account. Since 
information is the basis for reasoning, if all 
information is not taken into account, then 
conclusions may be reached that would have been 
ruled out by information that was ignored, or 
conclusions that might be suggested by the 
ignored information will fail to be reached. 
2 More information is sought when appropriate. 
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This strategy is a supplement to strategy 1 when 
the information given in a problem situation is 
insufficient. 
3 Alternative conclusions, explanations, 
hypotheses, and plans are generated. Induction 
does not force unalterable conclusions. An 
individual who reasons well will realize this 
and consider alternatives. This strategy 
involves the creative element of inductive 
reasoning as alternatives are not always 
obvious. 
4 Judgement is withheld where appropriate. While 
one considers alternatives, judgement must be 
withheld. This follows from strategy 3. 
5 The likelihood of progress is monitored. 
Progress must be evaluated as one moves towards 
a desired goal. An individual must know how 
close he or she is to a solution or when the 
solution is at hand. Without this assessment, 
there is no way to guide the inductive reasoning 
process or to bring it to a close. 
6 Complex problems are handled in a clear and 
orderly fashion. (See strategy 7.) 
7 The main point is kept in mind. The authors 
describe strategies 6 and 7 as implicit within 
the whole process of inductive reasoning. These 
strategies "permeate good inductive reasoning 
and are displayed in the reasoner's tying every 
action to the purpose at hand and never losing 
sight of the goal". 
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Each scoring guide consists of a chart comprised of a 
series of columns and rows. The scoring chart of Day 2 is 
presented in Table 3.2. The events of Day 2 can be found in 
the test presented in Appendix B. 
Each row of the chart represents a different inductive 
reasoning strategy, either strategy 1, strategy 3, or 
strategy 2 and 3 together. Each column represents what the 
authors call a "data package". Each data package centres 
around a piece of information from each particular day. 
These pieces of information appear at the top of each 
column. Sometimes they are designated as "need to be 
explained"; other times they are designated as "relevant". 
These are the pieces of information judged most important 
for the examinees to consider. 
Below the piece of information at the top of each data 
package are the appropriate kinds of actions for the 
examinees to perform with regard to the information. Also 
indicated to the right of each statement of action is the 
score to be awarded when the examinee takes the action 
indicated. Below this are spaces for recording the total 
score for each column as well as the percent of the possible 
total. 
In addition, there are four questions concerning 
different inductive reasoning strategies that apply to the 
subjects' answers as a whole. Points are awarded as 
indicated for use of these respective strategies. 
Table 3.2 
Scoring Chart for Day 2 of the Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning 
Strategies. 
Strategy 
1 
3 
2+3 
Data Package 1 
River and Valley 
(relevant) 
Return to explore 
2 
5 
Data Package 2 
Photographs 
(relevant) 
Examine for 
2 
Data Package 3 
Eggshell-like 
objects 
(need to be 
explained) 
Creatures 
Inorganic matter 
Other 
Try to discover 
2 
5 
5 
5 
Check in water 5 creatures 5 constituents 5 
Other 
Column total 
Possible total 
Column % 
1. (Strategy 4) 
2. (Strategy 5) 
3. (Strategy 6) 
4. (Strategy 7) 
5 Examine for clues Explore for whole 
of creatures 5 eggshells 5 
Other 5 Other 5 
17 17 
To what extent are alternatives other than living creatures 
considered? (Range: 0-5) 
Is the likelihood of progress monitored? (Range: 0-5) 
Is the response clear and orderly? (Range: 0-5) 
Is the focus good? (Range: 0-5) 
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From these raw scores three further scores are 
calculated: (a) strategy scores, (b) depth of consideration 
scores, and (c) breadth of consideration scores. 
The strategy score gives as a percentage how much a 
strategy was used compared to how much it could have been 
used in the ideal response. From Table 3.2 it can be 
observed that on Day 2 it is possible to score six points 
for strategy 1, two points for each data package. If an 
examinee recognizes that the photographs and eggshell-like 
objects are relevant, but does not take into account the 
river and valley, he or she will score four of a possible 
six points. Thus the score for strategy 1 on Day 2 is .67. 
To determine an overall test score for strategy 1, the 
strategy 1 scores of all three days are averaged. The 
overall total score of the test is the average score for all 
strategies. 
The depth of consideration score is an indication of 
the amount of action taken in response to relevant pieces of 
data or data in need of explanation. The authors describe 
depth of consideration as a continuum from a minimum of just 
referring to a piece of information to a maximum of 
providing possible explanations for it and recognizing the 
need for additional information to evaluate possible 
explanations. Depth of consideration is indicated by how 
far down a data package examinees proceed when considering 
the information heading that data package. The depth score 
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for a data package is the fraction of the total possible 
score received for that data package. For example, in Table 
3.2, it can be seen that an examinee can score a maximum of 
17 points in data package 1. If that examinee recognizes 
that the river and valley are relevant, and suggests to 
check in the water for living creatures, he or she will 
receive 7 of the possible 17 points, or a .41 depth of 
consideration score for data package 1. This score is 
calculated for each data package and averaged to produce the 
depth of consideration score for Day 2. The overall depth 
of consideration score is the average of all depth scores 
from all data packages for all days. 
The authors describe ideal breadth of consideration as 
dividing one's effort proportionately among each data 
package. This is achieved when effort is distributed 
according to the proportion of the total possible score that 
a data package can contribute. In other words, if a 
particular data package can contribute 10% to the total 
possible score, an examinee's response in that data package 
should constitute 10% of his or her total effort. The 
authors call this the ideal proportion of effort. 
By referring to Table 3.2, it can be observed that data 
package 1 can contribute 17 out of a total possible 66 
points, or about .26 of the possible score for Day 2. This 
is the ideal proportion of effort for data package 1. 
Assuming an examinee scored 7 points on data package 1, and 
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a total of 41 points for all Day 2 data packages, the actual 
proportion of effort on data package 1 would be .17. Thus, 
the examinees proportion of effort undershot the ideal by 
.09. 
To determine the breadth of consideration score, 
deviations, in absolute values, from the ideal proportion of 
effort are calculated for each data package and the average 
deviation is determined. Widest breadth of consideration 
would result in no deviations from the ideal, and the 
breadth of consideration score would be zero. The larger 
the score the smaller the breadth of consideration. 
To aid the task of scoring the essay test, the authors 
developed a computer program that (a) allowed the examiner 
to record personal data on the examinee, (b) allowed the 
examiner to record the scores of all data packages and 
strategy questions, (c) averaged all strategy scores, (d) 
calculated the overall test percentage and (e) calculated 
the average depth and breadth of consideration scores. The 
program displays each scoring chart as it appears in the 
· test manual, with the user able to enter scoring values 
directly into the scoring charts. The overall effect of the 
program is to greatly improve the consistency of the grading 
process. 
Achievement in Science 
Achievement in science was assessed using students' 
final science grades from the previous school year. The 
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major advantages of using this data as a measure of science 
achievement was that it was obtainable from existing records 
and was measured over the entire school year using numerous 
assessment instruments and procedures. One would expect the 
result to be a reasonably valid indication of achievement. 
Despite this, there are several concerns with using past 
grades as a measure of achievement. 
First, past grades are a measure of past achievement. 
The study correlates current conceptions and abilities with 
achievement of the school year past. The danger is that 
influencing experiences could have taken place between the 
time the science achievement grades were assigned and the 
time the students completed the instruments for the study. I 
am assuming that any such influences were small, since the 
time delay is relatively short. The main study was 
conducted during the month of November while the final grade 
for the previous year was awarded in June. Thus, the time 
delay is in the order of four months. 
Second, there was no way to control for different 
grading standards from teacher to teacher or from course to 
course. It is conceivable that two individuals in the study 
have equal grades but do not have equal abilities in 
science. In response to this limitation it was decided to 
use only grades from those science courses designed for 
students of average or higher academic ability. The 
standards for these courses are likely to be more consistent 
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since at the end of high school these students must pass 
provincially set examinations. Thus, in this study, science 
achievement refers the final grades assigned in the 
following subjects: (a) general science, (b) biology, (c) 
chemistry, (d) physics, (e) and earth science. 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 305 students from a public 
suburban senior high school in an eastern Canadian province. 
The school was a regional one with students from a wide 
geographic area attending. The total school population was 
approximately 800 in grades 10 - 12 with a teaching staff of 
43. Students were of varied socio-economic status and were 
from various cultural backgrounds, but were predominantly 
English Canadian. 
The sample was comprised of 165 females and 140 males. 
The subjects were distributed over the three high school 
grades with 91 grade ten, 116 grade eleven and 98 grade 
twelve students. Only subjects whose parents or guardians 
had previously completed a consent form were allowed to 
participate. Although the total number of students who 
completed at least one of the instruments was 346, due to 
absenteeism on either day and to students who exercised 
their right not to take part in either portion of the study, 
the actual number of students to complete both instruments 
was 305. Table 3.3 provides a detailed summary of subjects' 
sex and grade. 
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Table 3.3 
Number of Subjects by Sex and Grade Completing Both 
Instruments 
Male 
Female 
Total 
10 
40 
51 
91 
Grade 
11 
52 
64 
116 
12 
48 
50 
98 
Total 
140 
165 
305 
A total of 17 classes, including seven grade 10, four 
grade 11, and six grade 12 classes, were involved in the 
study. Enrolment in different courses was open to students 
of different grades, provided core and pre-requisite 
conditions were met. For example, grade 12 students could 
be found in the grade 10 biology and grade 10 physics 
classes. However, there were no grade 10 students in the 
grade 11 and 12 courses. 
Three cooperating teachers were involved in the study. 
They held science and education degrees at the Bachelor's 
level and all had majored in biology. One teacher held an 
education degree at the Master's level. All were teaching 
at the school for a minimum of six years and had seven, 
eleven, and twenty-two years of teaching experience. All 
three teachers were male. 
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Administration of Instruments 
Instruments were administered during regular 40 minute 
class periods under the supervision of the cooperating 
teacher. The epistemological questionnaire was administered 
first followed by the inductive reasoning test in the same 
class period the very next day. In that class period on the 
third day any students who were absent from either of the 
previous two periods were administered the instrument that 
they had not completed. Students who had completed both 
instruments were assigned seatwork in their subject area. 
At the beginning of each session, subjects were again 
informed of the purpose of the study, the first time being 
when the original consent letter was sent to their parents. 
The instructions were then read aloud by the cooperating 
teacher before the subjects began. Subjects were not given 
extra time and all questionnaires and tests were collected 
at the end of the class period. 
CHAPTER IV: QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT 
Philosophical Dimensions of the Questionnaire 
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This section attempts to establish the construct 
validity of the dimensions of scientific knowledge logically 
derived from the literature. Proposing a specific 
philosophical model on which to base the questionnaire is 
inappropriate since, as noted previously in chapter II, 
there is no consensus on what that model should be. 
Instead, the approach taken in this study is to derive from 
the literature various dimensions of scientific knowledge 
that (a) are considered essential to one's conception of 
scientific knowledge, and (b) are believed to affect the use 
of knowledge in the reasoning process. Thus, the author 
does not argue for or against any particular conception of 
scientific knowledge. 
Dimensions were developed from: (a) portions of the 
philosophical models of existing instruments (COST, NOSS, 
NSKS, SPI, & WISP), (b) selected philosophical literature 
(Conant, 1951; Hanson, 1958; Hardwig, 1985; Hempel, 1966; 
Hodson, 1986a; Kuhn, 1962; Norris, 1984; & Popper, 1972), 
and (c) psychological literature that deals with 
epistemology and understanding (Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985; 
Schommer, 1989). The contribution of these sources and the 
descriptions of the dimensions will be presented in the 
subsequent sections. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the 
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seven dimensions derived from the synthesis of the 
literature. 
Table 4.1 
A Summary of the Questionnaire Dimensions 
Dimension 
Scientific truth 
Fallibility 
Changeability 
Creativity 
Testability 
Speed of acquisition 
Role of authority 
Summary 
The relationship between 
scientific statements and the 
nature of the universe, its 
phenomena and relationships 
(Kimball, 1967; Scientific 
Literacy Research Center, 1967). 
The role of observation and the 
influence of current theoretical 
beliefs (Hanson, 1958; Hodson, 
1986a; Norris, 1984). 
The development of scientific 
knowledge over time (Conant, 
1951; Kimball, 1967; Kuhn, 1962; 
Rubba, 1976; Schwab, 1960; 
Scientific Literacy Research 
Center, 1967). 
The role of creativity in 
accounting for natural phenomena 
(Popper, 1972; Rubba, 1976). 
The question of whether 
scientific knowledge must be 
reproducible (Cotham & Smith, 
1981; Hempel, 1966; Scientific 
Literacy Research Center, 1967). 
The rate at which scientific 
knowledge is developed 
(Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985). 
The role of questioning in the 
acceptance of scientific 
knowledge (Hardwig, 1985). 
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Items of the questionnaire were based on these seven 
dimensions, thus forming seven subscales. Two conceptual 
alternatives for each subscale were developed and items 
constructed relating to each. Thus, each subscale was 
polarized, with one set of item statements written 
representing one pole, and another set of statements written 
to reflect the alternate pole. By representing conflicting 
views, the subscales provided subjects with an opportunity 
to hold varied conceptions. 
Since the questionnaire format chosen was a five point 
Likert-type rating scale (to be described subsequently), 
subscale average scores below a value of 3 represent beliefs 
leaning towards one pole of a dimension of scientific 
knowledge, while average subscale scores of greater than a 
value of 3 represent beliefs leaning towards the alternate 
pole. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the dimension poles 
and sample statements from the questionnaire worded 
consistently with the alternate conceptions. Greater detail 
on scoring is provided in a subsequent section of this 
chapter. 
In most cases, there is a consensus in the literature 
about which view is more accurate. In some cases, though, 
the issue is not as apparent. For example, within the 
fallibility subscale, the conception that scientific 
knowledge can be doubted and is sometimes created in error 
is much more prevalent. If one examines the history of 
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Table 4.2 
Summary of Questionnaire Dimensions. Dimension Poles. and Sample Statements Worded Consistently with Alternate Conceptions 
Dimension 
Scientific truth 
Fallibility 
Changeability 
Creativity 
Testability 
Speed of acquisition 
Role of authority 
Dimension Poles Sample Statement 
Correspondence A scientific statement is true when it describes the world the way it really is. 
Coherence/ 
consensus 
Fallible 
Certain 
Changeable 
Fixed 
Created 
Found 
Testable 
A priori 
Slow 
Fast 
Reasonable 
Authoritative 
Statements about which scientists agree are true. 
We accept statements of scientific knowledge even though they contain 
error. 
Scientists do not make errors in their conclusions if they follow the scientific 
method. 
Today's scientific theories, laws, and concepts may have to be changed in 
the face of new evidence. 
After scientists think they have found the solution to a problem, they feel the 
problem has been solved once and for all. 
Scientific knowledge is the product of human imagination. 
Scientific theories are discovered, not created by scientists. 
Test results that can be repeated by other scientists are required for the 
acceptance of scientific knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge need not be capable of being tested by experiments. 
The solutions to scientific problems are developed gradually over time. 
If you are ever going to be able to understand a scientific statement, it will 
make sense to you the first time you hear it. 
Knowing when to seek an expert opinion is important when trying to solve a 
scientific problem. 
There is no purpose to questioning accepted scientific theory. 
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science, the fallibility of scientific knowledge can be 
demonstrated unquestionably. On the other hand, with regard 
to the truth subscale, neither the conception that 
scientific knowledge is true when it accurately represents 
natural phenomena nor when it enjoys a consensus among the 
leading scientists of the day, can be clearly demonstrated 
and is thus subject to great debate among philosophers. The 
sections that follow describe the seven dimensions in more 
detail. 
Scientific Truth 
Of the instruments examined that measure conceptions of 
the nature of science (and scientific knowledge), none dealt 
specifically with scientific truth. Some instruments, such 
as TOUS, include truth under the umbrella of "Aims of 
Science". That perspective is characterized by the search 
for scientific truth as a motivating force for the practice 
of science, not the perspective of emphasizing conceptual 
differences in the nature of truth. 
There are several possible reasons for the omission of 
scientific truth in the philosophical model of scientific 
knowledge. First, there is a lack of consensus among 
philosophers of science as to the nature of truth. Any 
philosophical model that includes a particular view of truth 
will be open to a degree of criticism. Second, the concept 
of truth is sophisticated and abstract. Students of high 
school age do not necessarily have well-formed, thoughtful 
views on the nature of truth. 
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If subjects do not know what 
they believe, then accurately assessing their views is 
particularly difficult, because some of their views may 
germinate from the prompts of the questionnaire. 
Scientific knowledge can be viewed as true from three 
perspectives. First, a scientific statement may be true 
because it corresponds to the natural world. Our knowledge 
is an approximation of reality. This is a traditional 
positivist view of scientific truth. Second, a statement 
may be considered true because it is consistent with our 
existing set of what we believe to be true statements. 
Finally, a statement may be considered true if it enjoys a 
consensus of belief among the members of the scientific 
community. These three viewpoints can be respectively 
labelled the "correspondence", "coherence", and "consensus" 
conceptions of scientific truth. To polarize the truth 
category of the questionnaire the coherence and consensus 
views were chosen to represent one extreme, while the 
correspondence view was chosen to represent the other. 
The position taken in this study is that a perspective 
on scientific truth is fundamental to understanding 
scientific knowledge, and thus should not be omitted from 
the questionnaire. It is reasonable to assume that 
individuals who view knowledge as a reflection of reality 
will draw different conclusions during reasoning than those 
individuals who believe knowledge to be a consensus of 
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opinion. Since these conceptions are still the subject of 
debate among philosophers, the decision as to which view is 
the correct one is still unresolved. Initially, the 
coherence and consensus view of truth was selected as the 
view to be scored highest. Results of the pilot study (to 
be described in a subsequent section) revealed that scoring 
the truth subscale high when responses matched this view of 
truth led to a subscale score that correlated negatively 
with the remaining subscales. Thus, the decision was made 
to score highest the statements agreeing with the 
correspondence view. 
Fallibility 
Many of the instruments examined in chapter II focused 
on the fallibility of scientific knowledge. The items in 
this category attempt to determine whether students believe 
scientific knowledge is certain or contains error and should 
be doubted. Believing that knowledge should be doubted 
should affect one's view of the conclusions drawn from 
reasoning. The consensus in the philosophy of science 
community is that scientific knowledge is fallible. 
Changeability 
This dimension of the questionnaire attempts to 
determine if students believe scientific knowledge is 
changeable or fixed. The history of science provides many 
examples of scientific knowledge that has changed either 
through an evolutionary or revolutionary process. Several 
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instruments examined, including Aikenhead's, Fleming's, and 
Ryan's (1987), Cotham's and Smith's (1981), Kimball's 
(1967), and Rubba's (1976), focused on the changeability or 
tentativeness of scientific knowledge. It is nearly 
universally believed in the field of philosophy of science, 
that scientific knowledge is changeable. 
Schommer (1989) provides an experimental link between 
this conception of knowledge and reasoning. She found that 
subjects who believed that knowledge was certain rather than 
tentative believed their conclusions to be also certain. 
Creativity 
The prevalent view of this dimension is that scientific 
knowledge is a product of the human mind that attempts to 
explain observed natural phenomena. A less sophisticated 
view is to believe that production of scientific knowledge 
simply involves uncovering what already exists. Creativity 
as a dimension of scientific knowledge is also emphasized in 
several philosophical models, for example Showalter's 
(1974), and Rubba's (1976) NSKS. 
Testability 
The role of testability of scientific knowledge is 
still the subject of debate among philosophers of science. 
The more modern view is that the production of scientific 
knowledge rests on principles derived from reason and may be 
independent of experience. This a priori view has stemmed 
from the writings of Kuhn (1962). The traditional 
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positivist view states that scientific knowledge must be 
subjectable to empirical test. For ideas to become part of 
the body of scientific knowledge, consistency of test 
results is a requirement. The validity of scientific 
knowledge is established through repeated testing against 
accepted observations (Rubba & Anderson, 1978) . This 
conception of scientific knowledge is a component of most 
instruments assessing the nature of scientific knowledge. 
Speed of Knowledge Acquisition 
This dimension of scientific knowledge can be derived 
from the work of Schoenfeld (1983, 1985). In his research 
with high school students' geometry proofs he found that 
certain students believed in quick, all-or-none learning. 
That is, they would spend a short time working on a problem, 
and, if they didn't find a solution in a few minutes, they 
assumed they would never find one. 
This dimension was not found in any of the 
philosophical models of scientific knowledge on which 
testing instruments were based. Schommer (1989) 
incorporates the category into her model of general 
knowledge and found that it affected subjects' 
comprehension. She found that subjects who believed 
knowledge was acquired quickly tended to make oversimplified 
conclusions, performed poorly on a mastery test, and 
overestimated their level of understanding of a passage. 
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Role of Authority 
The source of knowledge and the role of authority in 
producing that knowledge is a dimension that can be derived 
from the work of Perry {1968) who found that many students 
enter college with the belief that knowledge is simply 
handed down from authority. Other models that have 
incorporated the role of authority in knowledge production 
and acquisition are Welch's and Pella's SPI {1968) and 
Schommer's {1989). 
One view of the role of authority is that knowledge is 
derived from reason rather than handed down from authority, 
and that questioning authority is always appropriate. The 
dimension used in this study however, is a slight variant of 
that theme. While one pole is the view that knowledge 
should be accepted blindly, the other pole is the view that 
reasonable questioning is desirable. Reasonable questioning 
means that sometimes it is appropriate to accept knowledge 
handed down from authority. Sometimes the most sensible 
course of action is to seek expert opinion. 
This idea is what Hardwig {1985) describes as 
"epistemic dependence". He puts forth three arguments to 
support his contention that an appeal to intellectual 
authority constitutes justification for believing and 
knowing. First, he argues that one can have a good reason 
for believing a proposition if one has a good reason to 
believe that others have good reasons to believe it. 
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Secondly, he explains that since the layperson is the 
epistemic inferior to the expert, it may be more rational 
for the layperson not to rely on his or her own judgement in 
a matter that falls within the expert's area of knowledge. 
Thirdly, he maintains that the expert-layperson relationship 
is essential to the scientific and scholarly pursuit of 
knowledge. If all authority is questioned, then progress 
will not be made. 
Questionnaire Items 
Format 
The final version of the questionnaire is presented in 
Appendix A. The format of the items is that of a bipolar 
rating scale (Andrich & Masters, 1988). A statement about 
scientific knowledge is presented and subjects are to 
indicate whether they strongly agree, agree, are undecided, 
disagree, or strongly disagree. There are eight statements 
assigned to each of the subscales, four with model "agree" 
responses and four with model "disagree" responses. The 
sequence of items within the questionnaire was randomly 
assigned. 
With two extremes and a neutral response, this method 
of questioning was considered appropriate to isolate 
alternate conceptions. The form is economical for test 
construction, presentation, and administration. The 
procedure for completing this type of instrument was 
expected to be easily understood by high school students. 
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Having five points on the rating scale was considered large 
enough to take advantage of the subjects' capability to 
discriminate. Unlike a multiple-choice or an agree-disagree 
format, this particular format gives the subject an 
undecided or an "I don't know" option. A criticism of 
several existing instruments is that subjects are forced to 
respond to a statement as it is written with no provision 
for an undecided response (SPI and WISP). 
Though follow-up interviews to check subjects' 
interpretations of the item statements would be desirable, 
they were not possible due to practical limitations and time 
constraints. It is believed that the careful preparation of 
the questionnaire through the development process and pilot 
study has reduced the possibility of multiple 
interpretations. 
Construction 
Questionnaire items were derived from the philosophical 
literature cited earlier in the chapter. As well, existing 
instruments were examined and many items adapted. The 
instruments having the greatest influence on the 
construction of the questionnaire were NSKS, WISP, SPI, 
Carey (1988) and Schommer (1989). 
Item writing. Items were written by subscale following 
the guidelines suggested by Babbie (1973). Table 4.3 
provides a general overview of these guidelines and measures 
taken to follow them. 
Table 4.3 
Summary of Guidelines Followed for Constructing 
Questionnaire Items 
Guideline 
Make items clear. 
Avoid double-
barrelled 
questions. 
Respondents must 
be competent to 
answer. 
Simple items are 
best. 
Avoid biased items 
or terms. 
Measure taken 
The objective is for all respondents 
to interpret the statement the way 
intended by the researcher. An 
attempt was made to make the 
statements as specific as possible. 
Vague and ambiguous words were 
avoided. 
statements were limited to a single 
idea or concept. 
An answer option of "undecided" was 
provided for subjects who were unable 
to make selections with any degree of 
confidence. 
Long and complicated items were 
avoided. 
An attempt was made to eliminate any 
clues of responses scored highest. 
In addition to the precautions taken during item 
writing, measures were taken to improve the overall layout 
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and organization of the questionnaire. These included: (a) 
checking grammar, spelling, and punctuation, (b) using an 
easily readable font (courier 10}, (c) ensuring good 
duplication quality, (d) including instructions that were 
easy to understand along with an example of a completed 
item, and (e) avoiding cluttering within the questionnaire. 
Readability. Phillips (1989} describes readability of 
text as its legibility, ease of reading, and ease of 
understanding. A considerable challenge when developing the 
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instrument was to present the sophisticated philosophical 
concepts of the nature of knowledge in a readable form for 
high school students. 
A conscious attempt was made to keep the length of the 
items short, to avoid using difficult vocabulary, and to 
present the statements in a concise, non-ambiguous manner. 
The questionnaire was designed such that it could be 
completed easily by high school students in a 40 minute 
class period. Its duplication was of high quality. Items 
were completely legible. The number of items was kept low 
since the statements require reflection. Existing 
instruments which contain as many as 150 items (SPI) may not 
allow the subject adequate time to consider his or her 
beliefs. 
Several options were explored to assess the readability 
of the item statements. The idea of applying traditional 
readability formulae such as Fry's Readability Graph (Fry, 
1968), which uses the number of syllables in the words used 
and sentence length as its criteria for measuring 
readability, was dismissed. These readability indexes are 
not sensitive to the context within which the text is used 
and do not take into account the background knowledge of the 
reader. As a result, their validity is called into 
question. Fry's Readability Graph is characterized by the 
following anomalies: (a) mono-syllabic words that are 
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unfamiliar will improve readability; and (b) familiar multi-
syllabic words will decrease readability. 
Two sources were selected for a readability estimate: 
(a) student information from the pilot study, and (b) the 
judgement of high school science teachers. During the 
administration of the pilot questionnaire, students were 
instructed to write comments for items they did not 
understand or items that they thought were worded poorly. 
These comments were used to revise the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was also examined by a panel of two high 
school science teachers. The reading level was estimated by 
them to be appropriate for high school students. 
Scoring 
The questionnaire was scored using the procedure of 
assigning the values of 5 to 1 to the subject responses for 
each item. The value of 5 was assigned when the subject 
strongly agreed with the response considered most prevalent 
in the literature. A value of 1 was assigned when the 
subject strongly disagreed with this response. Half the 
items for each dimension were written negatively and were 
therefore reverse scored. The subscale scores are simply 
the average of the individual item scores in that particular 
scale. The overall questionnaire score is the average of 
all the subscale scores and represents the extent to which 
subjects lean toward the poles scored highest. Table 4.4 
provides a key displaying items worded consistently with 
specific conceptions within each subscale. 
Table 4.4 
Key Displaying Items Worded Consistently With Specific 
Conceptions Within Each Subscale 
Dimension Poles Items Representing 
Truth 
Correspondence* 
Coherence/Consensus 
Fallibility 
Fallible* 
Certain 
Changeability 
Changeable* 
Fixed 
Creativity 
Creative* 
Found 
Testability 
Testable* 
A priori 
Speed of acquisition 
Slow* 
Fast 
Role of authority 
Reasonable* 
Authoritative 
* Concept1on scored h1ghest 
12, 
24, 
2 I 
1, 
15, 
3' 
5, 
4, 
18, 
6, 
7, 
8' 
9, 
17, 
Pilot project 
38, 47, 51 
35, 39, 56 
13, 27, 32 
14, 22, 41 
45, 52, 55 
21' 31, 42 
28, 33, 49 
11, 20, 46 
34, 37, 43 
10, 16, 23 
19, 48, 54 
26, 29, 50 
40, 44, 53 
25, 30, 36 
102 
The pilot project was conducted in the same school as 
the main study. It involved 105 mixed ability students from 
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two grade 10 and two grade 12 biology classes with one 
cooperating teacher. The students completed a preliminary 
form of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was administered during a single 
period for each of the classes involved. Subjects were 
informed of the purpose of the pilot study, the instructions 
were read aloud by the cooperating teacher, and the subjects 
were instructed to write comments for any of the items they 
perceived to be poorly constructed. Results of the pilot 
study are presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Discussion is organized into three major sections. The 
first deals with the presentation and discussion of 
descriptive statistics relating to the instruments used. 
The second addresses the first two research questions by 
describing the status of students' conceptions, reasoning, 
and science achievement. The final section addresses the 
final three research questions and deals with the 
correlational results including the path analysis of the 
general causal model. Also, the results of a factor 
analysis of the questionnaire, and of a path analysis based 
on the factored variables, are presented and discussed. 
Descriptive Results: Measures 
Pilot Questionnaire Results 
The results of the pilot project indicated that several 
of the items were difficult for high school students to 
comprehend. Several items were lengthy andfor poorly 
worded. The analysis revealed that some items did not 
correlate with the questionnaire as a whole. The alpha 
reliability for the preliminary form of the questionnaire 
was 0.74. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the descriptive 
data gathered from the pilot questionnaire. 
Average responses on all subscales, with the exception 
of those on the truth subscale, leaned towards the pole 
scored highest. The fallibility, changeability, speed of 
acquisition, and role o f authority subscales had mean 
105 
responses approximately representing the "agree'' response on 
the five point rating scale. 
Table 5.1 
Per-item Means. Standard Deviations, and Sample Sizes by 
Subscale for the Pilot Questionnaire 
Subscale n Mean SD 
Truth 96 2.85 .324 
Fallibility 95 3.69 .353 
Changeability 94 3.80 .402 
Creativity 91 3.35 .372 
Testability 90 3.78 .372 
Speed of acquisition 100 3.99 .426 
Role of authority 94 3.73 .303 
Total 3.60 .366 
A surprising and interesting finding was that the truth 
subscale, for which the response scored highest represented 
the humanistic coherence and consensus view, correlated 
negatively with all other subscales. From these initial 
results, students' conceptions of scientific knowledge are 
shown to be represented by beliefs that knowledge: (a) is a 
reflection of the real world; (b) is fallible; (c) is 
changeable; (d) is the product of the human imagination; (e) 
must be testable; (f) is acquired slowly; and (g) should be 
reasonably questioned. 
Questionnaire Revisions 
The revised questionnaire was shortened from 67 to 56 
items. Those items containing difficult vocabulary, that 
were imprecise or lengthy, were reworded or deleted. 
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Items 
that failed to correlate with the general questionnaire were 
omitted. On the basis of the empirical evidence from the 
pilot, the decision was made to change the response scored 
highest for the truth category from the coherence/consensus 
view to the correspondence view. This change ensured that 
all subscales correlated positively with each other. 
The alpha reliability of the revised questionnaire was 
measured at 0.73, almost exactly the same as the pilot 
version. Even though the changes made would have improved 
the reliability, it is clear that there were counteracting 
influences as well. First, the overall number of items was 
reduced significantly, thereby reducing reliability. Also, 
several items were deleted that were considered difficult, 
ambiguous, or redundant, but were highly correlated with the 
general scale. Thus, their deletion had a negative effect 
of the instrument's overall reliability. 
Essay Test Inter-rater Reliability 
Since the Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies 
is in the early stages of its development, a measure of 
inter-rater reliability was necessary. The scorers were the 
author of this study and a cooperating teacher. The teacher 
taught high school science at a rural school. He held 
science and education degrees at the Bachelor's level. The 
school in which he taught was an all-grade school ~ith a 
high school population of approximately 150. 
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A sample of 30 randomly selected essay tests was used 
for the inter-rater reliability measure. The cooperating 
teacher was not one of those involved in the administration 
of the instruments and had no other connection with the 
study. He did not receive coaching or advice on the scoring 
of the tests other than being given a copy of the test 
manual. The inter-rater reliability was measured as a 
Pearson product-moment correlation of 0.81. 
Descriptive Results: Conceptions, Reasoning, 
and Science Achievement 
The discussion in this section provides a general view 
of the descriptive findings related to conceptions of 
scientific knowledge, reasoning strategies, and achievement 
in different science courses. Subscale scores of the 
epistemological questionnaire are examined to determine 
specific conceptions while inductive reasoning strategies 
scores give insight into the types of reasoning processes 
used on the essay test. General comparisons are made 
between the scores of each of the subscales of the 
questionnaire and between the inductive reasoning strategy 
scores. 
Students' Conceptions of Scientific Knowledge 
Results of the questionnaire analysis are presented in 
Table 5.2. The average item score on the total 
questionnaire was 3.67 on the 5 point Likert-type scale. 
Though there is no standard to represent adequacy of student 
conception, the score of 3.67 is considerably above the 
"neutral" position, and is clearly in agreement with the 
questionnaire responses scored highest. 
Table 5.2 
Per-item Means, Standard Deviations, and Sample Sizes by 
Subscale for the Epistemological Questionnaire 
Category n Mean SD 
Truth 331 3.36 0.37 
Fallibility 331 3.56 0.42 
Changeability 329 3.91 0.45 
Creativity 334 3.43 0.38 
Testability 333 3.79 0.38 
Speed of acquisition 334 3.87 0.44 
Role of authority 334 3.77 0.38 
Total Score 304 3.67 0.23 
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The highest average score (3.91) is the category of 
changeability. It seems that high school students recognize 
that scientific knowledge can and will change. In addition, 
the high scores indicate that high school students' 
conceptions of knowledge include beliefs that: (a) knowledge 
is acquired slowly, (b) knowledge must be able to be tested, 
and (c) sometimes it is appropriate to question authority 
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while at other times seeking expert opinion is a logical 
course of action. They believe, though less strongly, that 
scientific knowledge contains error and that it is the 
product of creative human minds. It appears there is some 
belief in the naive conception that scientific knowledge is 
simply "discovered". The lowest average score (3.36) was 
from the truth category. students generally believe that 
scientific knowledge represents natural phenomena, that is, 
the correspondence view. 
Students' Inductive Reasoning Ability 
Results of the Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning 
Strategies are presented in Table 5.3. The mean total score 
of the test was .311. This result, while apparently very 
low, is to be considered with caution. It is not known what 
good reasoners of high school age should score on this test. 
As with conceptions of knowledge, there are no absolute 
standards. There is no absolute measure of good reasoning 
or even adequate reasoning. The essay test itself is in the 
process of being validated and has not been correlated with 
other reasoning tasks. All that can be said with confidence 
is that compared to the model scoring guide provided by the 
authors, students scored an average of .311 of what was 
possible for them to score. Taking these considerations 
into mind, this result seems to support previous findings 
that the level of reasoning ability shown by students is 
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inadequate (Perkins, Allen, & Hafner, 1983; Schoenfeld, 
1985) . 
Table 5.3 
Means, standard Deviations, and Sample Sizes for the Essay 
Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies, Part A 
# Strategy 
1 Considering all information 
3 Alternate explanations 
2+3 Seek more information to 
generate explanations 
4 Withholding judgement 
5 Monitoring progress 
6 Keeping process clear and orderly 
7 Keeping focused 
Total Score 
Average depth 
Average breadth deviation 
n Mean 
311 .516 
311 .188 
311 .162 
310 . 057 
311 .171 
311 . 557 
311 .793 
311 
311 
311 
.311 
.182 
.217 
so 
.183 
.107 
.084 
.163 
.241 
.214 
.235 
.162 
.077 
.066 
Subjects scored an average of .217 on breadth. The 
overall breadth score is the average of breadth scores 
derived from measuring the actual proportion of effort for 
each data package compared to the ideal proportion of effort 
for each data package. This score is unlike the others in 
that lower values indicate better reasoning. Values closest 
to zero deviate the least from the ideal and indicate 
greater breadth of reasoning. The result indicates that 
subjects deviated an average of 21% from the ideal 
proportion of effort. While noteworthy, this deviation does 
not seem excessive. It appears that subjects actual 
proportion of effort is reasonably close to the ideal. 
Scores obtained from the data packages were generally 
proportionate to their total scores. Again, lack of 
standards for adequacy make this result difficult to 
interpret. 
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Subjects scored an average of .182 on depth. The 
overall depth score is the average of scores derived from 
measuring the number of explanations and alternate 
conclusions given within a data package as compared to the 
maximum number provided by the authors in the scoring key. 
It seems that the subjects only gave superficial treatment 
to the relevant points that needed explanation. The 
subjects provided less than 20% of the depth that was 
provided in the model of reasoning provided by the authors. 
This supports the previous research of Bereiter and 
Scardamalia (1985), Gettys and Englemann (1983), and 
Perkins, Allen and Hafner (1983) who respectively state: 
students only access a small portion of their knowledge when 
solving a problem, students fail to fully explore problem 
situations, and students analyse problem situations 
superficially. 
When a comparison is made between the strategy scores, 
it can be observed that differences are quite dramatic. 
Subjects scored the highest (.793) on strategy 7, keeping 
focused to the main point. Subjects scored the lowest 
(.057) on strategy 4, withholding judgement. An interesting 
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possibility is that the high score of strategy 7 may have 
contributed to the low score of strategy 4. It seems that 
during the test session subjects kept focused to the task at 
hand, the search for living creatures, but failed to 
consider the possibility the living creatures might not 
exist. It may be that subjects' perception of the task was 
to search for creatures that were there. If subjects 
perceived from the outset, for whatever reason, that 
creatures were present, there would be no reason to withhold 
judgement. It is true that as the days passed in the essay 
test simulation the accumulation of clues seemed to indicate 
an increasing likelihood that creatures were present. 
Both the strategy 1 score (.516) and the strategy 6 
score (.557) indicate these processes were handled less 
competently than strategy 7. With strategy 1 the subjects 
seemed to be able to recognize about half of the points of 
information that are relevant or need explanation. The 
strategy 6 score indicates that the problem was handled in a 
clear and orderly fashion about half of the time. 
The remaining three strategies, providing alternate 
conclusions and explanations (.188), seeking more 
information when it's appropriate (.162), and monitoring 
progress (.171), all scored extremely low. This reasoning 
seems to be characterized by an inflexibility that forces 
the individual to follow a set path that may or may not lead 
to a solution. What's more, subjects seem not to be 
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interested in determining if in fact they are on the right 
path at all. This supports Schoenfeld's (1985) contention 
that problem-solvers often pay little attention to the 
approach used to solve a problem, and often fail to consider 
whether the approach is justified or even whether progress 
is being made. 
Students' Past Achievement in Science 
Even though there is not a research question that 
specifically addresses differences in achievement between 
different science courses, science achievement is an 
important variable in the web of relationships being 
examined. Thus, it is relevant to note that different 
science courses offered in the school in which the study was 
carried out have a difference in average grade covering a 
range of more than 10%. Table 5.4 displays the comparative 
average grades in the science courses offered. 
Table 5.4 
Average Science Course Achievement 
Course 
General Science 
Biology 
Chemistry 
Physics 
Earth Science 
Average Mark (%) 
73.9 
66.2 
66.7 
65.5 
63.2 
114 
Test of the Causal Model 
Since achievement in each science course is a different 
dependent variable, a separate correlational matrix was 
prepared for each. As well, a path analysis had to be 
completed separately for each measure of science 
achievement, and again, separately, for each measure of 
science achievement in a factored causal model. Results 
will be presented and discussed by science group, first for 
the correlational matrix, then for the general causal model, 
and finally for the factored causal model. A summary of all 
research questions and pertinent findings will be found at 
the end of the chapter. 
Relationships Among Variables 
Pearson correlations for all variables are provided in 
Table 5.5. Strong correlations were found between 
conceptions of scientific knowledge and science achievement 
for all sciences except Earth Science, which had a very 
small sample size of 20. Due to the small sample, and the 
resulting unstable analysis, the earth science data will not 
be included in subsequent data presentation and discussion. 
overall, students who hold conceptions of scientific 
knowledge that lean towards dimension poles scored highest 
achieve better in general science, biology, chemistry, and 
physics. This suggests three possible explanations. 
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Table 5.5 
Pearson Correlations Among Conceptions of Scientific 
Knowledge, Inductive Reasoning, and Science Achievement for 
each Science Subject. 
Conception Reasoning 
Reasoning .160 
General Science .465 .358 
Reasoning .204 
Biology .401 .266 
Reasoning .125 
Chemistry .388 -0.065 
Reasoning .194 
Physics .435 .224 
Reasoning .354 
Earth Science -0.124 -0.020 
The first is the possibility that past science grades 
and the epistemological questionnaire measure the same 
thing. The relationship could be influenced by evaluation 
in these courses that may, in some cases, measure these 
epistemological issues directly. Although this is a 
possibility, it is not likely to be a major influence. The 
science curricula offered in these subjects do not place a 
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major emphasis on the nature of scientific knowledge. The 
different dimensions of the nature of scientific knowledge 
are not taught as part of the prescribed curriculum. 
Conversely, the epistemological questionnaire does not test 
science content. 
The second explanation is that conceptions of 
scientific knowledge and achievement in science may be 
influenced together by a common variable not included in the 
causal model. It is likely that a variable, such as 
students' intelligence, affects their achievement in 
science. The effect of intelligence on conceptions of 
scientific knowledge, however, is unclear. 
Third, the relationship may exist because students who 
have adequate conceptions of scientific knowledge also use 
that knowledge more effectively, and thus score higher 
science grades. This lends support to the hypothesis that 
students who have a deeper understanding of the nature of 
scientific knowledge will attain higher science scores. 
Correlations between reasoning and achievement were 
somewhat lower, the highest being with general science. The 
correlations between reasoning and chemistry achievement and 
reasoning and earth science achievement were negative. As 
stated previously, the earth science data are, at best, 
unstable. The negative correlation between reasoning and 
chemistry, while not statistically significant, is 
nevertheless, interesting. Were this result sustained in 
further research, it would be difficult to explain why 
students who did better on the Essay Test of Inductive 
Reasoning Strategies performed more poorly in chemistry. 
One would expect the academic ability of the chemistry 
students to be similar to that of the physics students. 
Both are usually top academic students, generally of the 
highest ability. 
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The correlations between conception of scientific 
knowledge and reasoning ability are generally low, but 
consistently positive. The strongest relationship was shown 
for the biology and earth science groups. It appears that 
performing well on the epistemological questionnaire and on 
the reasoning test are related, but the order of the 
relationship is relatively low. This supports the 
hypothesis that students who have a deeper understanding of 
the nature of scientific knowledge are better reasoners. 
Path Analysis of the General Causal Model 
The standardized coefficients and R2 s for the general 
recursive model are reported in Table 5.6. The coefficients 
of determination (R2s) indicate that significant portions of 
variance in science achievement can be predicted from 
conception of scientific knowledge and inductive reasoning. 
As much as 30% of the variance for general science 
achievement can be predicted by the two independent 
variables. 
Table 5.6 
Standardized Coefficients, R2s, and Sample Sizes Among 
Conceptions of Scientific Knowledge, Inductive Reasoning, 
and Science Achievement for each Science Subject 
Dependent Variables 
n 
Reasoning 89 
General Science 89 
Reasoning 131 
Biology 131 
Reasoning 78 
Chemistry 78 
Reasoning 61 
Physics 61 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** 
Independent Variables 
Conception Reasoning 
.160 -----
.419*** .291** 
.204* -----
.362*** .192* 
.125 -----
.403*** -0.115 
.194 -----
.407** .145 
p<.001 
.026 
.299 
.042 
.196 
.016 
.164 
.038 
.210 
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It is observed that knowledge conception significantly 
affected general science, biology, chemistry, and physics 
achievement. All are powerful effects, three of them 
significant at the .001 level. 
The effect of the intervening variable of reasoning on 
science achievement was generally weaker than that of 
knowledge conception, but in the case of general science and 
biology achievement the effect was still significant. With 
chemistry achievement, the intervening variable of reasoning 
had a weak, but negative, effect. This result is curious 
since conceptually is seems inconsistent that being able to 
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reason better would result in poorer performance in a school 
subject. Further research is needed to determine if there 
are fundamental differences in the nature of course content, 
its presentation, or teaching methodologies between high 
school courses that might account for variation in 
reasoning. A repeat study, isolating the relationship 
between inductive reasoning and chemistry achievement would 
be desirable. 
The effect of scientific knowledge conception on 
inductive reasoning ability was found to be significant in 
the case of the biology group. In the other sciences the 
effect was positive but less powerful. The path diagrams 
for each path analysis are presented in Figures 5.1 - 5.4. 
ltnowledge 
Conception 
.160 
~9~·-·-·----------~ 
Gen. Science 
Achievement 
.--------------, ~1 * * 
:Inductive 
Reasoning 
Figure 5.1. Path diagram of effects on general 
science. 
(** p<.01; *** p<.001) 
Figure 5.2. 
lCnowledge 
Conception 
.204* 
~2--·-·-·-----~ 
Biology 
Achievement 
.---- - --- -, ~. 
:Inductive 
Reasoning 
Path diagram of effects on biology. 
(* p<.05; *** p<.OOl) 
lCnowledge 
Conception 
.125 
~3·-·-·------~ 
Chemistry 
Achievement 
,------- -----, /..115 
Figure 5.3. 
(*** p<.OOl) 
:Inductive 
Reasoning 
Path diagram of effects on chemistry. 
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Figure 5.4. 
(** p<.01) 
Xnow1edge 
Conception 
.194 
~7··-·-------------. 
Physics 
Achievement 
.-------------~ 
Inductive 
Reasoning 
Path diagram of effects on physics. 
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In order to provide a closer examination of the effects 
of knowledge conception, the direct effects on reasoning and 
the direct and indirect effects on achievement are presented 
in Table 5.7. It can be seen that the mediating effects of 
reasoning are quite small. Direct effects of scientific 
knowledge conception are much more potent than the indirect 
effects. Even the negative indirect effect of reasoning on 
chemistry change the total effect of knowledge conception 
very little. This again indicates that reasoning plays a 
much smaller role in determining science achievement than 
does conception of scientific knowledge. 
Table 5.7 
Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects Among Conceptions of 
Scientific Knowledge, Inductive Reasoning, and Science 
Achievement for each Science Subject 
Dependent 
Variables 
Reasoning 
G. Science 
Reasoning 
Biology 
Reasoning 
Chemistry 
Reasoning 
Physics 
Independent Direct 
Variables 
Conception .160 
Conception .419 
Reasoning .291 
Conception .204 
Conception .362 
Reasoning .192 
Conception .125 
Conception .403 
Reasoning -0.115 
Conception .194 
Conception .407 
Reasoning .145 
Indirect 
(Through 
Reasoning) 
.047 
.039 
-0.014 
.028 
Total 
.160 
.466 
.291 
.204 
.401 
.192 
.125 
.389 
-0.115 
.194 
.435 
.145 
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The comments of the anonymous reviewer of this thesis 
are relevant here. "To what extent is inductive reasoning 
an element of the academic activities and tasks that occur 
in our learning environments?" the reviewer asks. These 
results support the findings of several studies related to 
the current status of our instructional activities. They 
indicate that activities such as those involving inductive 
reasoning strategies are all but ignored in our present 
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curriculum (Bloom, 1989; Dusch! & Wright, 1989; Gallagher, 
1991; Mitman et al., 1987; and Tobin, 1987). For example, 
Mitman et al. {1987) found that teachers rarely or never 
teach noncontent components of science in their 
presentations and academic work assignments, and that 
teachers' references to noncontent components were generally 
of poor quality. In addition, students perceive content as 
the prominent focus of teacher instruction. 
Overall, the results of this study show there is 
limited support for the hypotheses that a deeper 
understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge will 
result in better reasoning. There is inconsistent support 
for the hypothesis that better reasoning will result in 
higher achievement in science. There is strong support for 
the hypothesis that a deeper understanding of the nature of 
scientific knowledge will result in higher science 
achievement. 
Factored Dimensions of the Questionnaire 
An exploratory factor analysis was completed to isolate 
specific components of the conception of scientific 
knowledge that influence inductive reasoning and science 
achievement. It was used to determine whether there was an 
underlying pattern of relationships existing among the seven 
questionnaire subscales. The factor analysis allowed the 
subscales to be reduced to a smaller set of factored 
epistemological dimensions to be used as variables in the 
statistical analysis. Thus, the significant effects of 
total knowledge conception on reasoning and achievement 
previously determined can be examined and analysed as the 
sum of the factored epistemological components. 
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The correlational matrix from which the variables were 
extracted is presented in Table 5.8. The factor analysis 
performed was a principal component analysis extracting four 
factors, with a varimax rotation. It was decided to extract 
four factors since the size of the eigenvalues after the 
fourth remained approximately constant. 
Results of the Factor Analysis. Table 5.9 displays the 
rotated loadings from the factor analysis. Inspection of 
the factor 1 loadings indicate that truth and testability 
are highest correlated. The responses scored highest in 
these categories are a correspondence view of truth and the 
notion that knowledge must be empirically testable. Both 
these conceptions imply that knowledge reflects real, 
intelligible, and sensory perceptible phenomena. This is 
basically a Realist view of scientific knowledge and as a 
result, the factor 1 variable is labelled "realistic". That 
is, the knowledge represents phenomena that are able to be 
perceived clearly with the mind and senses. 
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Table 5.8 
Correlational Matrix for Questionnaire Subscales 
Subscale 1. 2. 3 . 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Truth 1.000 
2. Fallibility .172 1.000 
3. Changeability .200 .270 1.000 
4. Creativity .044 .225 .091 1.000 
5. Testability .314 .198 .264 .074 1.000 
6. Speed of acquisition .191 .121 .256 .090 .218 1.000 
7. Role of authority .312 .286 .308 .052 .304 .182 1.000 
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Table 5.9 
Rotated Loading of the Factor Analysis 
Rotated Loadings 1 2 3 4 
Truth .836 .027 .092 .053 
Fallibility .133 .473 -0.067 .635 
Changeability .044 -0.063 .359 .768 
Creativity .017 .938 .066 .002 
Testability .712 .048 .149 .210 
Speed of acquisition .182 .058 .927 .100 
Role of authority .468 -0.044 -0.085 .639 
Variance explained by 1.1479 1.115 1.036 1.458 
rotated components 
Percent of total 21.122 15.932 14.800 20.829 
variance explained 
An examination of the factor 2 and factor 3 loadings 
reveal creativity and speed of acquisition factors. They 
will be labelled "creative" and "developed" to describe the 
responses that knowledge is a product of the human 
imagination, and knowledge is acquired slowly and developed 
over time, rather than acquired quickly. 
The loadings of factor 4 reveal that fallibility, 
changeability, and role of authority are all highly 
correlated. As such they will be combined to be the fourth 
factored variable. The responses scored highest for these 
categories describe knowledge as (a) containing error, (b) 
being subject to a constant change process, and (c) being 
open to question depending on specific circumstances. These 
responses describe the human influence on the creation and 
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interpretation of knowledge. To emphasize the error and 
instability inherent in knowledge, the factor 4 variable is 
labelled "humanistic". 
Theoretical Model of Factored Epistemological 
Variables. Questionnaire sections that loaded on the same 
factors were added together creating four new factored 
variables. These were then used to model effects on 
reasoning and science achievement. The difference between 
the previously examined general model and the factored model 
is that the direct causal relationship between conception of 
scientific knowledge and science achievement, and between 
conception of scientific knowledge and reasoning, is sub-
divided into four different causal effects in the factored 
model. Thus, in the factored model, there are four direct 
effects of conceptions of scientific knowledge on 
achievement in science, and four indirect effects of 
conception of scientific knowledge on science achievement. 
There are four direct effects of conception of scientific 
knowledge on inductive reasoning. The theoretical model 
representing the factored epistemological categories is 
displayed in Figure 5.5. 
Realistic 
Creative] 
Developed 
Humanistic 
Science 
Achievement 
1 
Inductive 
Reasoning 
Figure 5.5. Theoretical model of causal 
relationships among factored 
epistemological categories, inductive 
reasoning, and achievement in science. 
Path Analysis of the Factored Epistemological Model. 
The standardized coefficients and R2s for the factored 
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epistemological model are reported in table 5.10. The path 
diagrams for each analysis are presented in Figures 5.6 -
5.9 at the end of the section. 
With regard to the dependent variable of science 
achievement, it is observed that realistic and humanistic 
factors have a significant effect on general science and 
biology achievement. This means that those general science 
and biology students who believe that knowledge (a) is an 
approximation of natural phenomena, (b) must be testable, 
and (c) influenced by human factors will achieve higher 
grades. The conception that knowledge is slowly 
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Table 5.10 
standardized Coefficients, R2s, and Sample Sizes Among Factored Epistemological 
Variables, Inductive Reasoning, and Science Achievement for each Science Subject 
Dependent Independent Variables R2 
Variables 
n Realistic Creative Developed Humanistic Reasoning 
Reasoning 89 -0.048 -0.094 -0.123 .327** .095 
G. Science 89 .241* .066 -0.048 .303** .263** .325 
Reasoning 131 .102 .017 -0.091 .221 .068 
Biology 131 .175 .053 -0.052 .319*** .163* .225 
Reasoning 78 -0.081 -0.016 .188 .110 .041 
Chemistry 78 .024 -0.042 .355** .241 -0.156 .230 
Reasoning 61 .220 -0.174 .117 .051 .088 
Physics 61 .312* .093 -0.060 .186 .142 .246 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.OOl 
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acquired or developed over a period of time significantly 
affected chemistry students only. The realistic factor only 
had a significant effect on physics achievement. This means 
that those students who believed in a correspondence view of 
truth, and that knowledge must be testable, achieved higher 
grades in this subject. Creative knowledge was not found to 
be significant on any variables. 
With regard to reasoning as a dependent variable, it 
can be seen to be significantly affected only by the 
conception that knowledge is humanistic. Thus, for general 
science and biology students a belief that knowledge is 
fallible, changeable, and open to question results in better 
reasoning. 
Overall, two patterns emerge from the data. First, the 
effects on general science, biology, and to some extent, 
physics achievement, seem to be parallel. They are affected 
significantly by conceptions that knowledge is realistic and 
humanistic, with the exception of physics which is only 
affected by the realistic conception of knowledge. They are 
negatively affected by the conception that knowledge is 
slowly acquired and developed over time. Chemistry 
achievement, alternately, is not affected by conceptions of 
realistic or humanistic knowledge, but is significantly 
affected by the conception of developed knowledge. Again, 
the exception for chemistry achievement is quite 
interesting. Chemistry is not perceptibly different from 
the other sciences with regard to the teaching of how 
knowledge is acquired. 
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The second pattern is that conceptions that knowledge 
is creative and developed, for the most part, negatively 
affect achievement and reasoning. Thus, the large direct 
effect obtained for the general conception of knowledge on 
reasoning and achievement are due to the realistic and 
humanistic components of the total knowledge conception. 
To allow a closer examination of the effects of the 
factored epistemological variables, the direct and indirect 
effects are presented in Table 5.11. Again it can be seen 
that the mediating effects of reasoning are quite small. 
The largest indirect effects were humanistic knowledge on 
general science achievement, humanistic knowledge on biology 
achievement, and realistic knowledge on physics achievement. 
overall, the variables having the greatest effect on 
achievement are realistic and humanistic knowledge. The 
variable having the greatest effect on reasoning ability was 
humanistic knowledge. 
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Table 5.11 
Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects Among Factored 
Epistemological Variables, Inductive Reasoning, and Science 
Achievement for each Science Subject 
Dependent 
Variables 
Reasoning 
General Science 
Reasoning 
Biology 
Reasoning 
Chemistry 
Reasoning 
Physics 
Independent 
Variables 
Realistic 
Creative 
Developed 
Humanistic 
Realistic 
Creative 
Developed 
Humanistic 
Reasoning 
Realistic 
Creative 
Developed 
Humanistic 
Realistic 
Creative 
Developed 
Humanistic 
Reasoning 
Realistic 
Creative 
Developed 
Humanistic 
Realistic 
Creative 
Developed 
Humanistic 
Reasoning 
Realistic 
Creative 
Developed 
Humanistic 
Realistic 
Creative 
Developed 
Humanistic 
Reasoning 
Direct 
-0.048 
-0.094 
-0.123 
.327 
.241 
.066 
-0.048 
.303 
.263 
.102 
.017 
-0.091 
.221 
.175 
.053 
-0.052 
.319 
.163 
-0.081 
-0.016 
.188 
.110 
.024 
-0.042 
.355 
.241 
-0.156 
.220 
-0.174 
.117 
.051 
.312 
.093 
-0.600 
.186 
.142 
Indirect 
Reasoning 
-0.013 
-0.025 
-0.032 
.086 
.017 
.003 
-0.015 
.036 
.013 
.002 
-0.029 
-0.017 
.031 
-0.025 
.017 
.007 
Total 
-0.048 
-0.094 
-0.123 
.327 
.228 
.041 
-0.080 
.389 
.263 
.102 
.017 
-0.091 
.221 
.192 
.056 
-0.067 
.355 
.163 
-0.081 
-0.016 
.188 
.110 
.037 
-0.040 
.326 
.224 
-0.156 
.220 
-0.174 
.117 
.051 
.343 
.068 
-0.043 
.193 
.142 
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Realistic I 
Gen. Science 
Creative I 
.263** 
Developed 
Reasoning I 
Humanistic 
Figure 5.6. Path diagram of causal relationships among 
factored epistemological categories, reasoning, and 
general science achievement. (* p<.05; **p<.Ol) 
Realistic 
Biology 
Creative J 
.163* 
Developed 
Reasoning ! 
Humanistic 
Figure 5.7. Path diagram of causal relationships among 
factored epistemological categories, reasoning, and 
biology achievement. (* p<.05; *** p<.OOl) 
134 
Realistic 
Chemistry 
Creative 
-0 . 1 56 
Developed 
Reasoning I 
Humanistic 
Figure 5.8. Path diagram of causal relationships among 
factored epistemological categories, reasoning, and 
chemistry achievement. (** p<.Ol} 
Realistic 
Physics 
Creative 
.142 
Developed 
Reasoning I 
Humanistic 
Figure 5.9. Path diagram of causal relationships among 
factored epistemological categories, reasoning, and 
physics achievement. (* p<.05} 
Summary 
Research Question #1: What conceptions of scientific 
knowledge are held by high school students? 
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students' conceptions included beliefs that scientific 
knowledge: (a) represents real world phenomena, (b) is 
fallible, (c) is changeable, (d) is a product of the human 
imagination, (e) must be subjectable to empirical test, (f) 
is acquired slowly, and (g) should be questioned when 
reasonable to do so. 
Research Question #2: What inductive reasoning strategies 
are used by high school students? 
Students' strategy scores indicated that they were best 
able to keep focused on the reasoning task. They generally 
considered relevant information, and kept the reasoning 
process clear and orderly. Students scored poorly on 
strategies involving withholding judgement, seeking more 
information when necessary, producing alternate 
explanations, and monitoring their own progress while 
reasoning. A total average score of .311 on the Essay Test 
of Inductive Reasoning Strategies seems to indicate low 
overall reasoning ability. 
Research Question #3: What is the relationship between 
students' conception of scientific knowledge and their 
inductive reasoning ability? 
Students' conception of scientific knowledge had a 
positive, but limited, effect on inductive reasoning 
ability. Only for the biology group did knowledge 
conception exert a significant effect on inductive 
reasoning. 
Research Question #4: What is the relationship between 
students' conception of scientific knowledge and their 
achievement in science? 
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The relationship between students' conception of 
scientific knowledge and their achievement in science was 
the strongest found. In all cases knowledge conception 
exerted a strong influence over achievement, with the effect 
on general science, biology, and chemistry significant at 
the .001 level. With physics, the relationship was 
significant at the .01 level. 
Research Question #5: What is the relationship between 
students' inductive reasoning ability and their achievement 
in science? 
The relationship between students' inductive reasoning 
ability and their achievement in science was found to be 
inconsistent. With general science and biology, inductive 
reasoning exerted a significant effect. With physics and 
chemistry, inductive reasoning did not have an effect. 
Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis, that students who have a deeper 
understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge are 
better reasoners, was supported only for the biology group. 
The second hypothesis, that students who have a deeper 
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understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge will 
obtain higher achievement scores, was strongly supported for 
all groups. The third hypothesis, that students who are 
better inductive reasoners will attain higher science 
achievement scores, was supported for the general science 
and biology groups. 
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CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF IMPLICATIONS 
The study examined a causal model describing the 
relationships among conceptions of scientific knowledge, 
inductive reasoning, and science achievement. The model 
proposed the following relationships: (a) students' 
conceptions of scientific knowledge will influence their 
achievement in science, (b) students' conceptions of 
scientific knowledge will influence their inductive 
reasoning, (c) students' inductive reasoning will influence 
their achievement in science, and consequently, (d) 
students' conceptions of scientific knowledge will 
indirectly influence their achievement in science through 
changes in inductive reasoning. The basis for the model was 
the theoretical support, derived from the literature, for 
the assumption that beliefs about the nature of knowledge 
will influence how that knowledge is used. 
Summary of Measures and Methodology 
A review of the existing instruments assessing the 
nature of scientific knowledge revealed that none of those 
examined would be appropriate for use in this study. The 
Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies, Part A was 
selected as the measure of reasoning ability. Final science 
grades from the previous school year were used as the 
measure of science achievement. 
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Epistemological Questionnaire 
Through an examination of the philosophic literature 
and existing instruments assessing conceptions of the nature 
of science, dimensions of the nature of scientific knowledge 
were isolated. These included: (a) scientific truth, (b) 
the fallibility of scientific knowledge, (c) the 
changeability of scientific knowledge, (d) the role of 
creativity in scientific knowledge production, (e) the 
testability of scientific knowledge, (f) the speed of 
scientific knowledge acquisition, and (g) the role of 
authority in scientific knowledge production. 
The 67 item preliminary form was piloted with 105 
students in a suburban regional high school. On the basis 
of the pilot data, the questionnaire was revised resulting 
in a final version of 56 items containing eight item 
statements pertaining to each dimension of scientific 
knowledge. 
Essay Test of Inductive Reasoning Strategies 
To complete the essay test, subjects had to imagine 
they were on an imaginary planet for four days with their 
task being to search the planet for living creatures. They 
were asked to read about the things that happen each day, 
and to think about what these events mean for their search. 
Subjects were then asked to write what they are thinking 
about the things that happened on that and previous days; 
and write what they plan to do on their search because those 
things happened. Subjects' reasoning was then measured 
against an ideal for the situation. 
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The theoretical basis for the test is Ennis's view of 
induction as a type of inference within the larger context 
of critical thinking. The test assesses seven strategies 
used in inductive reasoning: (a} recognizing relevant 
information, (b) seeking information when appropriate, (c) 
producing alternate conclusions or explanations, (d) 
withholding judgement, (e) monitoring progress, (f) being 
organized, and (g) staying focused. 
Method 
A sample of 305 mixed ability, high school students 
completed the epistemological questionnaire and the essay 
test. Descriptive assessments of students' conceptions and 
inductive reasoning ability were made and results on the 
epistemology questionnaire were correlated with overall 
performance on the essay test and with the students' past 
achievement in each science course. A path analysis was 
completed to determine the strength of the relationships 
proposed in the general causal model. 
In order to isolate the causal effects of specific 
aspects of conceptions of scientific knowledge, an 
exploratory factor analysis was performed on the seven 
questionnaire subscales. Four factored epistemological 
variables were produced characterizing scientific knowledge 
as: (a} realistic, (b) creative, (c) developed, and (d) 
humanistic. A theoretical causal model incorporating the 
factored variables as conceptions of scientific knowledge 
was proposed and evaluated. 
Summary of Findings 
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It was found that student responses on the 
epistemological questionnaire generally leaned towards the 
dimension poles scored highest. The highest subscale score 
was for the student belief that scientific knowledge was 
changeable; the lowest was for the student belief that 
scientific knowledge approximates real world phenomena. 
Students also held conceptions that scientific knowledge: 
(a) is fallible, (b) is a product of human creativity, (c) 
must be testable, (d) is acquired slowly, and (e) should be 
questioned where appropriate. 
Depth scores from the inductive reasoning test revealed 
that subjects gave only superficial treatment to the 
relevant information provided. Poor strategy scores 
indicated that subjects tended not to: (a) seek more 
information when appropriate, (b) generate alternate 
explanations or conclusions, (c) monitor their progress, or 
(d) withhold judgement. In light of these scores and low 
total scores, student inductive reasoning was judged 
generally inadequate. 
When all variables were correlated, strong 
relationships were found between conceptions of scientific 
knowledge and achievement in general science, biology, 
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chemistry, and physics. The relationship between inductive 
reasoning and achievement in science was found to be 
inconsistent. Lower level correlations were found between 
conceptions of scientific knowledge and inductive reasoning 
ability. 
Results of the path analysis for the general model 
showed significant effects of conceptions of scientific 
knowledge on achievement in all sciences. There was a 
smaller effect from reasoning, though the relationship was 
still significant for general science and biology 
achievement. The effect of conception of scientific 
knowledge on inductive reasoning was found to be significant 
only for the biology group. Direct effects of scientific 
knowledge conception were found to be much more powerful 
than the indirect effects through reasoning. 
The path analysis for the factored epistemological 
model indicated that the large direct effect obtained for 
conception of scientific knowledge on achievement was 
generally due to the realistic and humanistic components of 
the total scientific knowledge conception. The direct 
effect of scientific knowledge conception on inductive 
reasoning was due to the humanistic component of the 
scientific knowledge conception. 
Discussion of Implications 
From the examination of the research literature and 
from the difficulties and concerns experienced when 
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selecting and developing instruments for this study, it is 
apparent that there should be an emphasis placed on the 
testing and measurement of epistemology and reasoning. 
There is a need for more and better instruments to assess 
students conceptions of scientific knowledge. Tests should 
be developed that enable a portrayal of students' particular 
views of the nature of scientific knowledge, not of whether 
or not they hold the correct view. There is also a need for 
more and better tests of reasoning, including inductive 
reasoning, and there should be more studies to determine 
current levels of student reasoning ability. A consensus is 
required on what reasoning abilities students should hold. 
The results of the present study support Schommer's 
(1989) contention that the conclusions students draw from 
knowledge are influenced by their interpretation of that 
knowledge. It was observed that general science and biology 
students who believed knowledge to be humanistic, that is, 
to be fallible, changeable, and open to reasonable 
questioning, scored significantly higher on the inductive 
reasoning test. Thus, holding these specific views of the 
nature of scientific knowledge modified how these students 
used that knowledge in the reasoning process. 
An interesting finding relating to the status of the 
current science curriculum was the identification of those 
specific epistemological views that result in better science 
achievement. Since holding these views results in higher 
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science scores, it is logical to assume that these views are 
endorsed by our present science curricula, either explicitly 
or implicitly. Specifically, general science and biology 
students who believed that scientific knowledge is realistic 
and humanistic, and physics students who believed that 
scientific knowledge is realistic, obtained significantly 
better achievement scores. Thus, holding the positivist 
view that scientific knowledge is a faithful copy of reality 
results in better grades in our present curriculum than 
believing that scientific knowledge results from consensus 
among members of the scientific community and from coherence 
with our existing set of beliefs. 
This supports Duschl's (1983) view that science 
teachers' beliefs and curriculum materials are congruent 
with the conceptions of logical positivism. Science for 
these teachers typically consists of a body of knowledge 
arrived at by neutral, objective application of scientific 
method (King, 1991). Teachers and students are reinforced 
in this philosophy by curriculum materials in which authors 
tell a story of what we know. Textbooks are idealized and 
present scientific knowledge as "revealed truth" 
(Brickhouse, 1989; Gallagher, 1991). 
Teachers' conceptions influence decisions that affect 
the learning environment. These include decisions related 
to laboratory instruction, use of demonstrations, word 
usage, instructional goals, and selection of curriculum 
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materials (Brickhouse, 1991; Duschl, 1983). Clearly then, 
teachers holding conceptions characterizing logical 
positivism influence what and how students learn in these 
science courses, and thus influence student achievement. 
These results focus on the need to de-emphasize the outdated 
philosophy of logical positivism that dominates our high 
school curricula, and to place an emphasis on the humanistic 
and social issues related to the nature of science (Duschl, 
1988). 
Before curricula can be developed with a greater 
epistemological focus, three key questions must be 
addressed: (a) What epistemological beliefs should be 
taught? (b) How do we best teach epistemological beliefs? 
and (c) To what extent are the effects of epistemological 
beliefs on inductive reasoning and achievement generalizable 
to other tasks and domains? 
Explicitly teaching a specific set of epistemological 
beliefs about scientific knowledge implies that the nature 
of scientific knowledge is known. A danger exists that 
students will perceive the particular philosophical view 
presented as the single correct view. Therefore, it is 
important that teachers and curriculum developers present 
the nature of scientific knowledge as open, dynamic, and 
subject to interpretation. Clearly, the most modern 
philosophical views should be taught, but students should 
also be made aware of alternate and older views. To 
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demonstrate the dynamics of epistemological beliefs, topics 
should be presented in a historical context. 
The level of cognitive development of the learners must 
be an important consideration in deciding what 
epistemological topics to teach. While some dimensions of 
knowledge, such as fallibility, may be easy for young 
children to grasp, other dimensions, such as the nature of 
scientific truth, are conceptually more difficult. Teachers 
and curriculum developers need to be aware that the views 
presented must be appropriate cognitively for the learners. 
At present, it is not clear how best to teach 
epistemological beliefs to produce the greatest influences 
on reasoning and achievement. The consequences of different 
types of explicit instruction are unknown. Simply making 
students aware of their own epistemological beliefs may be 
enough to improve reasoning and achievement. Current 
learning situations that stress content to the exclusion of 
epistemology, forgo the potential benefits of improved 
student reasoning. Teachers should incorporate not only 
considerations for the learner, but also the nature of the 
subject matter when designing instructional tasks. Programs 
designed to teach more reasoned conceptions and to emphasize 
the relationships among epistemology, reasoning, and 
achievement, should produce more profound benefits. 
The extent to which the effects of students' 
epistemology are generalizable to other tasks and domains 
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determines the significance of epistemology to the field of 
education. Through this study and Schommer's (1989} it has 
been shown that epistemological beliefs affect inductive 
reasoning and comprehension of a text passage respectively. 
The present study has also shown that significant effects of 
knowledge conception can be found on achievement in each of 
four different school science subjects. Many studies are 
necessary to determine the effect of epistemology on other 
tasks, aspects of comprehension, forms of reasoning, and 
achievement in different subject areas. If individuals' 
personal epistemologies affect a wide range of mental 
abilities, then this potentially can have a major impact on 
learning. Isolating the role of epistemology in student 
thinking will potentially have significant effects on 
curriculum and instruction. 
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SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Identification (name) : 
School: 
Grade level: Male: Female: 
James A. Duffett 
Department of curriculum and Instruction 
Memorial university 
of Newfoundland 
1990 
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STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
In this questionnaire, you are asked to read statements 
about scientific knowledge, and to tell how much you agree 
or disagree with each. 
This is not a test, and there are no right or wrong 
answers. Nobody will be told what answers you pick. The 
purpose is to find out how students in general think. 
Simply indicate how you actually feel about each 
statement. 
Example 
Read the statement below. On the right hand side of the 
page, there are five responses from which to choose. 
The responses are : 
Strongly agree SA 
Agree A 
Undecided u 
Disagree D 
Strongly disagree SO 
Circle the one that best expresses how you feel about 
the statement. 
1. 
STATEMENT 
Scientists always follow 
the scientific method. 
HOW YOU ACTUALLY FEEL 
SA u D so 
Some items may appear to be the same as others. Be sure 
to answer every item. 
1. 
2 . 
3 • 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
7 . 
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Strongly agree SA 
Agree A 
Undecided U 
Disagree D 
Strongly disagree SD 
STATEMENTS HOW YOU ACTUALLY FEEL 
Scientists do not make 
errors in their conclusions 
if they follow the 
scientific method. 
When there is some evidence 
against a scientific 
theory, scientists may 
still accept the theory. 
After scientists think they 
have found the solution to 
a problem, they feel the 
problem has been solved 
once and for all. 
Different scientists 
observing the same thing 
will draw the same 
conclusions. 
A scientific theory is 
similar to a work of art in 
that they both express 
creativity. 
Scientific knowledge need 
not be capable of being 
tested by experiments. 
The solution to a 
complicated scientific 
problem is not often 
obvious. 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
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Strongly agree SA 
Agree A 
Undecided U 
Disagree D 
Strongly disagree so 
STATEMENTS HOW YOU ACTUALLY FEEL 
8. If a person tries long and 
hard to understand a 
scientific problem, they 
will most likely end up 
being confused. 
9. By reporting their 
findings, scientists 
influence the beliefs of 
other scientists. 
10. When evidence is discovered 
indicating that a theory is 
incorrect, the theory is 
abandoned. 
11. Scientists rarely produce 
hypotheses on the basis of 
hunches or guesses. 
12. Scientific statements are 
descriptions of the world 
as it really is. 
13. We accept statements as 
scientific knowledge even 
though they contain error. 
14. The truth of scientific 
knowledge should not be 
questioned. 
15. Scientists often change 
their opinion in light of 
new evidence. 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
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Strongly agree SA 
Agree A 
Undecided U 
Disagree D 
Strongly disagree SD 
STATEMENTS HOW YOU ACTUALLY FEEL 
16. When a scientist produces a 
set of experimental 
results, it is not 
important that other 
scientists are able to 
reproduce those same 
results. 
17. Scientists rely primarily 
on the published results of 
other scientists for their 
conclusions. 
18. Scientists make progress by 
forming hypotheses and 
testing them. 
19. The longer you work at a 
scientific problem the more 
likely you are to find a 
solution. 
20. An idea is scientific if 
and only if it is the 
result of a systematic 
process of logical thought. 
21. A scientific theory gives 
the final answers to 
scientific questions. 
22. Scientific observations are 
not influenced by 
scientists' feelings. 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
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Strongly agree SA 
Agree A 
Undecided U 
Disagree D 
Strongly disagree SD 
STATEMENTS HOW YOU ACTUALLY FEEL 
23. A scientific theory need 
not correctly predict 
future events. 
24. Statements about which 
scientists agree are true. 
25. There is no purpose to 
questioning accepted 
scientific theory. 
26. Scientists seek problems 
where the answer can be 
easily and quickly 
discovered. 
27. Observation in science is 
influenced by personal 
opinion. 
28. An essential ability of the 
scientist is the ability to 
ask the right questions. 
29. If you are ever going to be 
able to understand a 
scientific statement, it 
will make sense to you the 
first time you hear it. 
30. Seeking expert opinion is 
not a good strategy for 
solving scientific 
problems. 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
u D SD 
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Strongly agree SA 
Agree A 
Undecided U 
Disagree D 
Strongly disagree SD 
STATEMENTS HOW YOU ACTUALLY FEEL 
31. Once accepted, scientific 
knowledge is no longer 
subject to change. 
32. The statements of science 
represent the best 
approximations of the 
natural world available at 
the present time. 
33. Scientific knowledge is a 
product of human 
imagination. 
34. Test results that can be 
repeated by other 
scientists are required for 
the acceptance of 
scientific knowledge. 
35. A statement is true when it 
corresponds to established 
scientific knowledge. 
36. Rules used when solving 
scientific problems were 
originally formulated by 
prominent scientists and 
can be applied without 
question. 
37. A theory may be modified 
when new evidence is 
discovered. 
38. A scientific statement is 
accepted when it accurately 
represents natural 
phenomena. 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u 0 so 
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Strongly agree SA 
Agree A 
Undecided U 
Disagree D 
Strongly disagree SO 
STATEMENTS HOW YOU ACTUALLY FEEL 
39. A true scientific statement 
will not contradict 
established scientific 
knowledge. 
40. When trying to solve a 
difficult scientific 
problem, it may be more 
reasonable to seek expert 
opinion than to seek a 
solution without help. 
41. A scientist will reject a 
scientific theory if she or 
he has doubts about it. 
42. Factual information does 
not change. 
43. Reliable observations are 
the means by which 
scientific laws, theories 
and concepts are tested. 
44. Advice from scientific 
experts should be 
questioned. 
45. Scientists consider 
scientific theories to be 
changeable. 
46. Scientific theories are 
discovered, not created by 
scientists. 
47. A scientific statement is 
true when it describes the 
world the way it really is. 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
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Strongly agree SA 
Agree A 
Undecided U 
Disagree D 
Strongly disagree so 
STATEMENTS HOW YOU ACTUALLY FEEL 
48. If a person can't 
understand a scientific 
statement within a short 
amount of time, they should 
keep trying. 
49. Original thinking is 
necessary for scientific 
work. 
50. Working hard on a difficult 
science problem for an 
extended period of time 
rarely pays off. 
51. True scientific statements 
accurately describe 
relationships in nature. 
52. Today's scientific laws, 
theories and concepts may 
have to be changed in the 
face of new evidence. 
53. Knowing when to seek an 
expert opinion is important 
when trying to solve a 
scientific problem. 
54. The solutions to scientific 
problems are developed 
gradually over time. 
55. Factual information is 
subject to change. 
56. A scientific statement is 
true if most scientists 
believe it. 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
SA A 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
u D so 
APPENDIX B 
Essay Test of 
Inductive Reasoning Strategies: Part A 
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Essay test of 
INDUCTIVE 
REASONING 
STRATEGIES 
PART A 
Are There Living Creatures on Zed? 
This test asks you to write down what you are thinking and what you plan to do as 
you work on a problem. 
You and two scientists must search the planet Zed for living creatures. You have only 
four days to explore before returning to Earth. Some of the things that happen each 
day are described. 
Directions 
Read about the things that happen on each day , and think about what they mean for 
your search for living creatures. 
Then, keeping in mind your search for living creatures: 
(1) write what you are thinking about the things that happened on 
that day and previous days; and 
(2) write what you plan to do on your search because those things 
happened. 
STEPHEN P. NORRIS and JAMES RYAN 
Institute for Educational Research and Development 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
Copyright, February 1987 
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Day 1 (An example) 
Your spaceship lands where you think your search might be successful. With life support suits on, you 
and the scientists start to walk away from the ship. You hear some high-pitched sounds which last for 
about twenty or thirty seconds. Then, your radio buzzes a warning. You return to the spaceship to 
check the instruments. You frnd a tape recorder is on. When the scientists return to the ship, neither 
remembers having turned on the recorder. · 
Here is an example of what you might write: 
It might be important to find out more about the high pitched 
sounds. They might be made by some living creatures, but many other 
things could have made them. I will listen for them again, and see 
whether there is any pattern or whether they come from a particular 
place. 
I wonder why my radio buzzed a warning? Did it buzz because the 
recorder was on or was there some problem in the instruments? I will 
check out the instruments to see whether everything is working properly. 
I shall also check for other things. Did some creature enter the 
ship? I will check to see whether anything is disturbed. lVhy was the 
recorder on? I will ask the scientists to try to remember whether they 
were using it before they went out. I will also check the recorder for 
malfunctions. It is also possible that some creature came in and turned 
on the recorder. I will set up something like a camera that will tum on if 
anything enters on one of the next days. This way, we will be able to see 
what it is. 
CONTINUE IN THE SAME MANNER FOR DAYS 2, 3, AND 4 
WHEN YOU HAVE READ THE EXAMPLE 
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YOU MAY GO BACK TO READ 
Day 2 
Today, you set out for a nearby hill. When you reach the top you see a valley below. There is a river 
flowing through the valley with a variety of vegetation and rock formations on either bank. You take 
some photographs of the landscape and begin to follow the river downstream. The water here is very 
clear and you can easily see to the bottom. In the water there are several cone-shaped, brownish 
objects which look like broken pieces of large eggshells. You pick one from the water. It is thin and 
you are able to crack it easily like an eggshell. You take it back to the ship. 
DO NOT GO AHEAD UNTIL FINISHED DAY 2 
175 
YOU MAY GO BACK TO READ BUT NOT TO WRITE 
Day 3 
First thing today the chemist analyzes the object you took from the water yesterday. She finds that it is 
made up of a combination of elements similar to those found in eggshells on earth. 
You then return to the river and notice that the water is muddy today. Just behind you is a cave. The 
chemist crawls in and returns a few minutes later. She says she heard many noises she did not 
recognize, and saw little trenches that went for a few meters and then disappeared beneath the walls. 
They were like those made by a rodent or some small animal. 
You have the rest of the day to explore the area before heading back to the ship. 
DO NOT GO AHEAD UNTD... FINISHED DAY 3 
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YOU MAY GO BACK TO READ BUT NOT TO WRITE 
Day 4 
This morning the chemist does another analysis on loose material collected from the floor of the cave 
yesterday. The analysis shows that the material could contain animal waste. The biologist examines a 
bag of material taken from the small trenches. He thought there was animal hair or fur in the bag but 
discovers that the material is a hairlike leaf from a plant which grows in the area. 
Since you must leave for Earth today you decide to explore the area near the ship. Before long you 
begin to hear high-pitched sounds like the ones you heard the day you arrived. There seems to be a 
pattern to the sounds, and they are coming from a number of places. You command the computer to 
record the sounds and play them back slowly. It plays a series of beeps and spaces, repeated over and 
over. You command the computer to broadcast the sounds into the atmosphere. You then hear another 
series of sounds which the computer says originated on Zed. 
You only have a few hours left to explore before returning to Earth. 
Unfortunately, there is no time left to explore, even though there is still a lot to learn. You must return 
to Earth. 
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